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R2P approached a normative turn with NATO’s intervention in Libya under a UNSC Chapter 
VII mandate and a near total shattering with the Syrian conflict; Mubarak’s reign over Egypt 
was ended by a popular uprising and a domestic justice mechanism set in motion to bring him 
and his sons to justice; Charles Taylor is sentenced to 50 years in jail for aiding and abetting 
the commission of serious crimes in the conflict in Sierra Leone. Despite these rapid 
developments in international justice, human security and the protection of civilians, the 
nexus between justice and reconciliation remains questionable. This study is thus set in this 
backdrop as it sorts to examine Rwanda’s post genocide justice system instituted as a 
necessary prerequisite to genuine reconciliation. By employing specific qualitative techniques 
designed to capture the perception of Hutu exiles and by examining four thematic issues 
associated with Rwanda’s genocide and employing a context driven dispute and conflict 
theory as a framework of analysis, the study reaches the conclusion that in the situation of an 
intra-state conflict deeply immersed in long term historical antagonisms driven partially by 
exogenously constructed ‘mythologies’ and a bystander effect that allowed the construction 
of a particular conflict frame the necessity of a post conflict justice system that recognizes a 
sense of shared loss is the most appropriate mechanism to achieve reconciliation.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
1. General Introduction 
Most wars in Africa are marked by enormous human suffering and destruction. The post war 
period is also marked by denial, revisionism, accusations and counteraccusations on the 
culpability of not only the conflict parties but also the distant and nearby bystanders and 
actors. Rwanda fits well into the frame of this description. The intrastate nature of the 
Rwandan conflict underscored by contested issues of creed, greed and need or even all of the 
three and fought in the full glare of the world’s media and the international community meant 
its prohibitions could hardly be ignored. By framing war as a world of ‘permissions and 
prohibitions’ Walzer underscores in a very salient way the complexity of the war enterprise 
and even more so its aftermath (Walzer 1977:38).
1
 In Africa, the absence of legitimate 
institutional framework to mediate between the various forces of society has transformed the 
conflict space into what Mbembe describes as a duality of facticity and arbitrariness void of 
rational or empirically tested justification (Mbembe 2001; 3-4). This arbitrariness is 
exacerbated by mythologies that become the singular unalterable norm that legitimate 
people’s actions.  
In many conflict ridden lands, ethnic plurality has become symbols of patriotic and racial 
identity discord which most often are instrumentalised by political elites to justify action and 
gain legitimacy. As a result, the lines between nationalistic hatred, racial prejudice, ethnic 
rivalry and religious enmity are virtually indistinguishable.  
Newbury argues that in Rwanda, while European policies did not create ethnic distinctions, 
they defined them within a particular set of oppositions, placed within a new resource 
environment. These constructed mythologies re-enforced through colonial stereotypes nursed 
that environment on which a conflict defined around ethnic lines will take root. The genocide 
in Rwanda cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans and changed the 
demographic reality of the country through massive loss of life and voluntary and forced 
migration into neighbouring countries. In less than three months, an estimated number of 
about 800.000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus who declared their sympathy with the Rwandese 
                                                          
1
War is still somehow a rule governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions, a 
moral world, therefore in the midst of hell. Though there is no license for war makers, there  
is a license for soldiers and they hold it without regard to which side they belong…  
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Patriotic Front (RPF) were slaughtered’ (Pottier 2002; 9). As Holzgrefe describes, an 
estimated 43,000 Tutsis were killed in Karama Gikongoro, a further 100,000 massacred in 
Butare; over 16,000 people were killed in around Cyangugu; 4000 in Kibeho; 5,500 in 
Cyahinda; 2,500 in Kibungo
2
. Mamdani (2002) observes that unlike the Holocaust, the 
Rwandan genocide was not carried out in a distance; in remote concentration camps beyond 
national boarders…it was as he contends executed with the slash of machetes.  The proximity 
between the perpetrators and the victims throws an interesting dilemma in post genocide 
reconciliation. This dilemma of knowing your abuser or that of your neighbour is what 
complicates a healing process still characterised by denial or revisionism.  
 
The genocide like past pogroms against the Tutsis resulted in millions of Hutus relocating 
into neighbouring and across western countries. Like in the past, the role of exiles in the next 
Rwandan episode has been crucial. The desire for accountability as a measure of fostering 
reconciliation necessitated the institution of a dual approach to post genocide justice 
rationalised as both a forward and backward looking regimes in dealing with Rwanda’s 
culture of impunity. There is always a strategic incentive for a post conflict state to frame its 
post conflict justice regime using political rational that defines its involvement in that 
conflict. This is based on several factors which are considered subsequently. These rational 
are important not only because a) they determine the nature of justice and b) subsequently 
translate transitional justice into foundation justice but also their crucial role in shaping post 
conflict institutions after the period of transition. 
 
Most post World War II post conflict justice systems have been designed around the 
‘Nuremberg paradigm’ in which the victor(s) set out to arraign, try and convict the 
vanquished mediated by international justice or customary norms and sometimes domestic 
rules. A paradigm shift since Nuremberg has been observed as innovative post conflict justice 
systems have emerged to prioritised forward looking approaches that foster reconciliation 
between former enemies. Despite these innovations there seems to be a gap between the 
theoretical conception of transitional justice and their practical operationalization. This gap is 
even more glaring because of the increasing tension between the necessity for truth or justice, 
and the global or the localised conceptions of justice. After the genocide, Rwanda became a 
case study for the United Nations and Rwanda itself for both state and nation building. The 
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 Alison Desforges (1999). Leave no one to tell the story; genocide in Rwanda. Human 
Rights Watch 
 3  
former was underscored by the destruction of the institutions of the state that could carter for 
the needs of the population and the latter by the lack of an overarching projected national 
identity beyond ethnic allegiances.
3
 Consequently after the genocide, the United Nations set 
up an ad hoc tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the violations of 
international humanitarian law during the period of 1
st
 January to 31
st
 December 1994.
4
  It 
rationalised the institution of this tribunal on the grounds of fostering reconciliation through 
accountability.
5
  Despite the effect the genocide had on the nation, the desire of the victorious 
leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to end what they perceived as a culture of 
impunity necessitated the setting up of domestic institutions of post genocide justice to bring 
to justice those responsible for the genocide and to foster reconciliation. The focus on 
retributive justice would be dealt with in more details in subsequent chapters. But as Levene 
argues, those mechanisms for forward or backward looking, massacre, real or imagined can 
be the rallying cry for a people or nation aggrieved, and thereby can potentially cast a shadow 
over inter-communal or even interstate relations. (Levene, 1999;3). Accordingly Elster 
argues, legal justice requires that processes of justice are based on unambiguous laws; that 
the judiciary is insulated from other branches of government, that judges and jurors are 
unbiased, and that the justice adhere to principles of due processes.( Elster, 2004; 135-139) 
The challenges according to Teitel are which rule of law values ultimately takes precedence 
in transition is a function of the particular historical and political legacies that is of the 
primary understanding of the sources of fear, insecurity.(Teitel, 2000:215). These historical 
realities transcended the particular situation of Rwanda and relate to a broader problematic in 
the constant struggle between local and international approaches to justice after massive 
violations of human rights. These historical realities shall be framed around four thematic 
areas which shall be dealt with extensively under specific areas in this study.
6
 The study thus 
focuses on these four thematic areas associated with the nature of post conflict justice and to 
eventually examine the challenges they posed and continue to pose to reconciliation and 
political order in Rwanda. 
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 Lemarchand argue that to «justify this drastic reconfiguration of collective identities, 
Rwandan officials are prompt to point out that the aim of the state at this critical juncture is to 
build a nation…»(Clark & Kaufmann 2008;65) 
4
 UNSC Res. 955(1994) 
5
 Ibid;1 
6
 They shall include(1) Codification of genocide under international law (II) Ethnicity (III) 
Humanitarian Intervention and (IV) Post conflict justice 
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The first two chapters focus on the research methodology and the basic approach to the study.  
Before positivist empiricism became the dominant mode of scientific validation, 
historiography provided an important inductive approach to scientific knowledge. Stedman 
argues that history was a science because it was composed of facts which were events which 
resulted from the actions of individuals producing them through the framework of institutions 
(Stedman, 1972;98). Capturing the historical development in Rwanda with a view to 
contextualising the genocide as a central issue within Rwanda’s post genocide justice system 
would be the essence of Chapter III of this study. Chapter IV focuses on the detail 
examination of themes associated with Rwanda’s post genocide justice architecture. The 
presentation of the raw data collected through various qualitative methods, their 
conceptualisation and analysis and the conclusion which summarises the findings of the study 
would be the essence of Chapter V of the study.  
 
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the various parameters, missteps and shortcomings 
that have made reconciliation an elusive enterprise in Rwanda. In undertaking this 
examination the study identifies four thematic areas that have been at the centre of scholastic 
work, political debates and have seem to shape our understanding of the Rwandan conflict. 
Though these thematic areas have been examined before, this study is set out on the 
presumption that a proper examination of these thematic areas within the scope of the general 
thrust of conflict situations and narrowing such understanding to Rwanda would produce a 
better understanding of the post genocide reconciliation enterprise in Rwanda. It is on the 
basis of such understanding that an appropriate system of post conflict reconciliation that 
reflects local realities and at the same time adheres to international standard of fairness can be 
instituted and ‘tolerated’ by both the vanquished and victors of any conflict. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There is a vast body of knowledge on the role of the ICTR, Gacaca and the national courts as 
both retributive and restorative form of justice dispensation in fostering reconciliation and 
establishing the basic state of political stability for development. Furthermore there is a 
strong knowledge base on the challenges this choice and form of arrangement has had on 
political stability. However it is the presumption of this study that these pools of knowledge 
reflect a holistic approach to determining the impact of a particular arrangement to 
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reconciliation based on the parameters that determined the choice of that arrangement. This 
study takes a micro approach by examining the effect of the specific themes associated with 
the genocide in Rwanda through a macro perspective. Although there is a holistic approach in 
dealing with these themes, it is designed at translating what is perceived to be a global 
phenomenon to a local reality.    
1.3 RESEASRCH QUESTION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE LITERATURE 
After most conflicts end the victors or an international regime (Paternalistic or trustee) has 
engaged in processes of dealing with the legacy of the conflict through arrangements known 
as post conflict justice or transitional justice. These have taken the forms of truth and 
reconciliation commissions, trials, purges; some of which have resulted in reparations, 
amnesties. These processes have been rationalised on the search for reconciliation and 
accountability and have been dependent on the duration of the conflict, the mode of its 
termination, the nature of the post conflict regime and at times the role the international 
community played in terminating the conflict and the what Teitel (2000) refers to as the 
historical realities of the particular situation. One of the most important reasons advanced 
across such societies have been the desire to foster reconciliation and to create the conditions 
of durable peace as an important prerequisite for reconstruction. In Rwanda the post genocide 
justice process worked on a crucial assumption. This assumption is that the nature of the 
conflict being addressed is accurately framed i.e. there was a genocide of Tutsis perpetrated 
by Hutus. This RPF centric conflict frame supported by a ‘guilty’ international community 
has been crucial in determining the nature of justice and the institutions that deliver it. 
My research question is therefore designed based on this assumption without any prejudice to 
its validity or not.  
What are the implications of post genocide justice on reconciliation efforts in Rwanda? 
 
1.4 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
A research problem defines an issue which exists in literature, theory or practice which 
necessitates a study (Creswell, 1994; Strauss et al, 1993). In light of the genocide that 
occurred in Rwanda in 1994, the Rwandan government and the international community have 
attempted to factor out the painful legacy; bestiality that took over Rwanda for 100 days 
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resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands of people. The basic premise for attempting to 
understand how human nature, rational or bestial, society ordered or anarchical could be so 
easily transformed as to devour its own children is necessary if post genocide Rwanda would 
be healed. The post genocide justice arrangement was established based a presumption. The 
presumption that there was genocide on the Tutsis perpetrated by Hutus at its early days was 
greeted by the Euphoria that enveloped a world still trying to come to terms with what had 
happened in Rwanda and its own negligence. On the other hand the Rwandan society was 
faced with the grimed task not only of rendering justice to those who had suffered but also to 
reconcile the society through processes that ensured accountability, healing, justice and 
possibly forgiveness. The startling reality then as it is today is that Rwanda was not dealing 
with a 100 day event. It was dealing with events of 100 days looking through the scope of its 
entire history. One of the first historical issues that had defined the conflict in Rwanda had 
been that of ethnicity. This problem stems from the construction of ethnicity designed around 
stereotypical physiological features meant purposefully to facilitate colonial rule. These 
stereotypical ideational structures were duly inherited by post-colonial regimes and were 
immediately translated into material structures of power and used to justify policies. This is 
an issue that either by omission or commission has been used to define Rwanda’s post 
genocide justice arrangements. The framing of the genocide convention and its subsequent 
codification into law as a deliberate intent to destroy an indelible group seems by all intent 
negationist in terms of the suffering of the other party to the conflict. While the ICTR statute 
defines its mandate as to deal with all crimes during the conflict, the domestic jurisdiction 
within Rwanda according to most Hutus has adopted a victor’s justice approach. This is 
reflected in an invitation I received to commemorate the 17th anniversary of what this 
Belgian Hutu group calls the ‘Rwandan tragedy’.  Consequently post genocide justice has 
followed a pattern that fails to address the root causes of the conflict between Hutus and 
Tutsis; instituted what Hutus perceived as the Nuremberg paradigm and has thus created a 
perceived justice system tailored towards collective retribution. The Hutus have a sense of 
collective guilt which does not only stem from how the genocide convention frames the crime 
from both a legal and sociological perspective but also from an angle that portrays justice as a 
victims/victors system of justice. While the Rwandan instituted both a traditional and 
community system of justice in what is popularly known as the Gacaca courts, speedy 
administration of justice was lacking due to the sheer number of people being detained. By 
the end of 2001 about 6500 genocide suspects had been judged with acquittal rate of 1000 
verdicts issued annually. The Tutsis also feel that the Hutus revisionist tendency amounts to 
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genocide denial or better put attempting to equate organised pattern of state-centric violence 
aimed at annihilation to acts of what Kagame describes as actions of rogue elements of the 
military arm of the RPF. They also feel that the current system of justice at the level of the 
ICTR established under UNGAOR 995 fails to provide effective justice. And at a very huge 
financial cost, bureaucratic inefficiency, insuperable and managerial difficulties between the 
Chambers, prosecutor’s office and the registry has portrayed the ICTR as an inefficient 
system of justice dispenser. It is a point stressed by President Kagame.  Tutsis feel not only 
betrayed by such a justice system but also by the fact that some countries which pushed for 
such a system considered divorced or abstracted from the reality of the victims still shelter 
some of the planners and perpetrators of the genocide (Mills & Brunner 2002;250). These 
countries and institutions are perceived as having failed the Rwandan people in their direst 
moment of need. The Rwandan government has also attempted to solve this problem with 
solutions that seems to de-ethicise Rwanda. By attempting to outlaw ethnicity through 
formulating laws that criminalise speech perceived as inciting or revisionist and at the same 
time instituting a remembrance ideology that translates into collective guilt of the Hutus 
generates conflict and as Hutus argue undermines the post conflict reconciliation efforts.  The 
Hutus perceived such policies as an attempt to create an ethnocracy. Lemarchand describes 
these setups as ‘manipulated and enforced memory’ which he asserts helps nurture ethnic 
enmity. The failure by the international community to intervene in Rwanda created a sense of 
abandonment and even conspiracy which seems to influence the form of justice and 
consequently the general sense of Hutu suspicion. Review of the literature has shown that 
many scholars of sort to explain possible reconciliation and healing mechanism. One of the 
most interesting was Staub’s ‘bottom-up to reconciliation, which attempt to promote changes 
in the population, and top-down approaches working with the media and leaders who can 
shape the attitudes of the community as well as the nature of institutions that may further 
reconciliation’.  This approach seems to focus on the internal dynamics to reconciliation. On 
the other hand, Rwanda’s history has shown that while internal dynamics seems to play a role 
in justifying rebellion against tyranny and oppression, the role of the expatriate community 
seems a constant in Rwanda’s ethnically driven cyclical alteration of power dynamics. 
1.5 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
The study adopted of an explorative format and thus did not seek to advance any normative 
judgement on the issues under study. It was also limited in its scope of data collection by 
focusing mainly on Hutu Rwandan exiles within some European countries. Though this is 
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within the scope of the study, it is relevant to note that most Rwandan exiles are in the 
immediate neighbouring countries surrounding Rwanda. Another important limitation of the 
study is rooted in the fact that the area of study is still on-going. Consequently some 
information presented in the study might actually change overtime.   
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.6.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The selection of the research methodology for this study was informed by the requirements of 
research topic, the hypothesis underlying the research variables as well as access to relevant 
information on the topic. The research process involved developing a purpose, developing 
research questions, collecting and analysing data, describing the methods used within the 
process, and presenting the information in a final conclusion or discussion section (Creswell, 
2005). There are two types of research methods relevant to the collection and analyses of 
data: Qualitative and Quantitative. The basic difference between the two methods lies in the 
research design which encapsulates the methods of data collection and analysis. Quantitative 
research involves gathering data that is absolute, such as numerical data, so that it can be 
examined in as unbiased a manner as possible. This method is very effective especially where 
the researcher has unimpeded access to the research area and the sources of data.  On the 
other hand, qualitative research method aims at providing an in-depth understanding of 
human motivations and activities and the reasons that govern such behaviour.  This was 
appropriate for this study considering the duration of the Rwandan conflict and the 
development of other conflicts which indicates the belligerent nature of the Rwandan. The 
propensity of the Rwandan people to resort to violence and to make peace can only be 
understood through a study of the motivations of the Rwandan people based on their socio-
cultural and psycho-sociological behaviour. Considering that the study is based on the 
specific case of Rwanda, the qualitative research method is more relevant in generating 
information only on the particular case study with a view to creating new hypothesis for 
further research. Through qualitative research method, the study undertook a more succinct 
and cost-effective methodology that produced the relevant outcome.  
1.7 SAMPLE SIZE: 
The study initially set out to interview about 20≤n≤30 respondents. The purpose was to have 
a number that could enable the detection of most or at least all of the perceptions that might 
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be important in answering the research question. Despite this very small number of projected 
respondents, I reached data saturation quite early during the interview process as most of the 
respondents were giving similar answers with very little noticeable variations. Nonetheless 
since the initial approach was not designed to develop a theory through some form of data 
saturation method, reaching the projected number of intended respondents was pursued. This 
part of the study ended up including 21 individuals as individual respondents and focus group 
participants. While I embedded for three days within Hutu exiles in Germany and Belgium 
and spoke with most of them, observed certain trends, these numbers are not factored into the 
study as ‘actual respondents’. 
1.8 ENTERING THE FIELD 
The objective of the interviews was to determine the ways that each individual perceives the 
individual aspect of the post conflict justice regime, how group solidarity influences such 
perceptions and how such perceptions influences reconciliation.  
I began my research in a very unlikely location. Berlin was not supposed to be my first stop 
but the cheap cost of flying into Berlin than Dusseldorf made the once divided city and now 
the powerhouse of European Unity and centre of a new European economic landscape the 
best place to begin a research about justice. I landed at the Berlin Schoenefeld airport, not far 
from the historic Templehof airfield that served so pivotally in the 1948 Berlin airlift. In 
1948, the Soviet Union blocked Western Ally’s rail and road access to parts of their occupied 
section of Berlin. The Western allies responded with an historical airlift to Western Berlin to 
supply the almost 2.5 million inhabitants dependent on external aid for survival. 
Controversially the success of the airlift led to the lifting of the blockade and the effective 
creation of two separate German states. Schoenefeld since then became the main airport that 
served the Democratic State of East Germany. From Berlin, I travelled to Duisburg where I 
setup base for the interview processes. My first second respondent was respondent A who 
was very instrumental in snowballing me to other respondents. 
Five days later, I travelled to Cologne where I attended a rare meeting of the Rwanda 
National Congress (RNC). The RNC is a loose association of exile Rwandans of both Hutu 
and Tutsi extractions. Though dominated by Hutus, a small group of influential Tutsis seem 
to have played an important role in its founding. The meeting started at 15.00 pm. I was 
introduced by respondent E to most of the officials before the meeting actually started. Most 
of the officials including respondent C, a former prosecutor at the ICTR were comfortable 
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with my presence including one of two ladies who actually referred to me as a ‘I am their 
brother’. It is a familiar theme echoed throughout the study. Il est Bantu one said with 
confidence. As the door shut behind me at 15.15, l had an eerie feeling. It felt like taking part 
in an Akazu meeting. Most of the participants seem very calm and most were also soft 
spoken. The former prosecutor actually assigned someone to help me in translation as the 
meeting ran entirely in Kinyarwanda. I took a seat near the exit as though preparing for any 
eventuality should any need arise. This seems to be prejudice at its best dictating my pattern 
of reasoning. The interpreter helped for a few minutes before becoming himself drowned in 
the deliberations. I took some pictures but was embarrassed when a former military officer of 
the FAR insisted his image be cut off the picture. All attempts to convince him that only his 
leg had appeared in the picture would hit a brick wall. I was forced to delete the picture.  
In a 23 page document written in English, the RNC stated its ‘core values, goals and an 
agenda for a new Rwanda.’ Its principal objective as stated in this document is to ‘stop and 
prevent violent conflict, including genocide and grave human rights violations…’, ‘eradicate 
a culture of impunity for human rights violation’. It proposes 13 strategies for ‘moving 
Rwanda towards achieving its goals and objectives’. The first of this thirteen strategy 
approach is ‘mobilizing the people of Rwanda to unite in the struggle against dictatorship’. It 
rationalized this strategy on the claim that ‘political leaders in Rwanda have fuelled sectarian 
divisions merely to cover-up their plans to monopolize political power’. Rwanda's ex-army 
chief, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa who now resides in exile in South Africa participated by 
Skype. General Nyamwasa survived an assassination attempt in June 2010 as gun men 
claimed to be under the orders of Rwanda attacked and wounded the General as he was being 
driven home. Also present at the meeting was Rene Mugenzi who had been informed by 
Scotland Yard in May 2011 that ‘“The Rwandan government poses an immediate threat to his 
life’ 
Many will wonder why a research about Rwanda should be taken place in Europe. I am 
interested in talking to exile Hutus on their opinion on a wide range of issues that impact 
political order in Rwanda. The choice of Hutu exiles is deliberate. Bakke in a 2010 paper 
argues as follows; ‘the causes or catalysts for intrastate struggles sometimes rest abroad. 
Scholars have argued, for example, that neighbouring states may become sanctuaries for rebel 
groups (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007), and that diaspora communities in 
either near or far-away countries sometimes fund and support rebellions back home 
(Adamson 2004; Lyons 2006; Smith 2007). First the Hutus form the majority of the Rwandan 
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population’.  With a staggering 85% of the population they form a solid majority that within a 
continent of ethnic solidarity even under a democratic setup can swing the country either 
way. Secondly the history of Rwanda is one that has seen exiles to be very instrumental in 
determining which ethnic group takes over the realm of powers. Thirdly it is my believe and 
supported by the literature that in present day Rwanda the criminalization of ethnicity makes 
it unlikely to get home base Hutus freely talking about the issues relevant to this study. The 
government initiated a policy of unity and reconciliation, a rare, intentional societal process 
to help people heal and reconcile. However, as part of unity, people are expected to consider 
themselves Rwandans and not to use the terms Hutu and Tutsi. Discussing differences 
between the groups has been called “divisionism.” This policy does noy allow Hutus to 
express their concerns and identity.  
 Lastly, what better place to start a research about post conflict justice than Germany where in 
1949 the Nuremberg paradigm was established? In international justice, the state has always 
been seen as the locus of legality, shielded from interference by the waning concept of 
sovereignty. In post WW II, the state became the central focus of investigation for being the 
central personality in the perpetration of crime. The shift from Nuremberg has been a shift in 
the consideration of the state as the central unit of analysis. If Nuremberg perceived crimes 
against humanity from an international perspective a shift in this paradigm has clearly 
situated crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide within a supranational 
perspective. Armed with an overwhelming believe that the RPF is liable in equal measure and 
convinced that continuous pressure will see the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968, one day work 
in their favour and convinced that the Rwandan cycle of alteration of power fuelled from 
abroad will continue, Hutu exiles seems to be the most important source of data to answering 
the research question of this study. 
1.9 TARGET POPULATION 
My decision to interview exile Hutus as opposed to Hutus in Rwanda is informed by two 
rational. The Hutu ethnic group carries with it a collective sense of guilt for the genocide. 
This is based on the way the genocide convention frames the crime and what Larmarchand 
calls a remembrance syndrome instituted by the post genocide government of Paul kagame. 
Apart from lack of funding to help me gather data from Rwanda as to validate my assumption 
of the fear factor in Rwanda, I presume base on reports of arrests, extra-territorial 
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assassination that those Hutus still residing in Rwanda have a stronger sense of this guilt and 
when interviewed, it is clear they will speak from a position of remorse and fear also 
exacerbated by ‘anti-ethnic policies’ of post genocide Rwanda. This may mask the 
underlying anger that the Hutu feels of the Tutsi based on perceived historical injustices they 
faced and the underlying rational informing the Tutsi rebellion which they perceived as a 
willingness by the Tutsis to regain power and continue the persecution of the Hutus. On the 
other hand exile Hutus have been at the forefront of anti Kagame activities that of course they 
perceive epitomises Tutsi domination. As exiles, despite living under the fear of external 
threat emanating from Rwanda they can speak out from a position of deep feeling. This is 
important to capture a frank and uninfluenced source of data that will be relevant for my 
analysis. I have decided not to interview Tutsis not only because there is enough literature 
that captures the genocide and explains the horrifying journey of the Tutsi but also because I 
do not want to fall into a comparative study. I have nonetheless been very close to Tutsis 
through my political activism. I have spoken to Rwandan diplomats of Tutsi origin and I have 
lived in the same home here in Norway with a Tutsi family that lost many family members 
during the genocide and through whom I have come to meet many other Tutsis including 
individuals who are still deeply involved in the resistance against what they called the 
genocidaires in Eastern Congo. I thus have a fairly understandable depth of the mind frame of 
the Tutsi which of course will be supplemented through the method of discourse analysis. 
The discourse analysis part of the research will focus on primary and secondary data obtained 
from the literature about the genocide and the other interrelated concepts including speeches, 
court transcripts, books, journal articles, movies, the analysis of documents and materials 
especially press releases, resolutions propagated by exile Hutu groups and other relevant 
sources of data. All though the qualitative method will enable the study to capture relevant 
information towards understanding most of the concepts under investigation; it will be most 
useful in the paper on post genocide justice in Rwanda. 
1.10 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
The form of interview was informed by my desire to give the Hutus a voice as to permit me 
capture the relevant issues necessary to answering my research question. Thus an in-depth 
unstructured interview was adopted throughout the interview process. This was appropriate 
not only because it provided a free flow of information but also because it captured 
perception, tone, attitude and other relevant issues necessary to understanding the Hutu. I also 
took part in strictly Hutu exile political conferences in Cologne and Bruxelles within which it 
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was possible to follow how they formulated their grievances and postulated on solutions to 
the issues meaningful to them. Furthermore it permitted me to have uncensored primary 
source of data through the various articulations during conferences and how these 
articulations are narrowed down into resolutions and policy positions. Taking part in focus 
groups discussions also added a comparative take on the various themes and issues that 
defines the Hutus not only as an ethnic group but also as a political block. I lived in a refugee 
camp with a couple of Rwandan exiles from Hutu extraction. One of this refugee comes from 
a prominent Rwandan family with a high level political background. The father is currently in 
jail for crimes committed during the genocide. Through him I came to meet several other 
Hutus and it will be fair to say they are all bonded together in solidarity to a common history.  
 
1.11 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis method adopted varied based on the type of data and the method used in 
collecting them. In qualitative data analysis observer impression is vital. Considering that, 
both primary and secondary data was collected for this study, my objective was to produce 
the data in a format that could be easily be analysed. The format included transcripts from 
interviews, focus group, field notes collected by participating in political meetings, 
demonstrations and ‘evening outings’ with more than one dozen Hutu Rwandans. The memos 
and notes were developed as soon as the data collection process began. These helped focus 
my mind and alerted me to significant points which came from the data. These memos and 
notes were analysed along with the transcripts. 
The qualitative nature of the research implied that data analysis was an on-going process, 
taking place throughout the data collection process. The study also took into consideration the 
emerging themes, adapting and changing the methods as required. Another analytical method 
that was employed in this research was discourse analysis. This method examined the 
patterns of speech, such as how people talked about a specific subject under discussion, the 
metaphors they use, and how they took turns in conversation. This analysis was used to 
interpret speech both as a performance which indicated an action and described a specific 
state of affairs or specific state of mind. Much of this analysis was intuitive and reflective. 
Finally, the data obtained through interviews, focus group discussions were validated using 
secondary data from books, research reports, journal articles. The information from published 
sources was analysed using content analysis. The findings were then extrapolated from the 
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competing arguments from the diverse group of respondents in relation to the secondary 
sources through triangular arguments. This represented an effective method of conveying 
original results based on a study like this. Using this method, data from different people and 
sources was compared and contrasted and the process continued.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY: 
The main aim of a theoretical framework is to explain the theoretical foundation of a research 
topic. A theory is regarded as a systematically related set of statements including some law-
like generalizations that are empirically testable. It is possible to perceive a number of 
common characteristics of a theory viz; abstractness, logic, propositions, explanations, 
relationships and acceptance by the scientific community. It is therefore important to base a 
study on a particular theory (Mjøset, 2000). The theoretical framework identifies and labels 
the important variables that are relevant to the research problem. This exercise enables the 
researcher to connect the dependent variables with the independent variables and elaborate 
any moderating variables. 
A theory is regarded as a systematically related set of statements including some law-like 
generalizations that are empirically testable. It is possible to perceive a number of common 
characteristics of a theory which include abstractness, logic, propositions, explanations, 
relationships and acceptance by the scientific community. They are generalisations about how 
the world works and why and how people act as they do.  The role of theory in the field of 
social science and where it situates in the research framework has always created a challenge 
for the researchers consequently all studies must have a solid theoretical basis. Though such 
validities are questioned as legitimating itself by stressing its capacity to construct universal 
grammar that produces forms of knowledge that privileges a number of categories…defining 
the objects of enquiry, establishing relations of similarity and making classifications. 
Situations of conflicts and consequently post conflict reconciliation can be context specific 
depending on whether they are intra or interstate conflicts. A towering question raised by 
Professor Menkel Meadow is whether the field of conflict resolution has any broadly 
applicable theory that works across the different domains of international and domestic 
conflicts.  He answers this question by stressing the need of context in understanding and 
resolving conflicts. As he aptly puts it ‘context may matter a great deal, as does the history, 
culture, personality, situations, geography, economics, and politics that construct those 
contexts’.  Though Meadow negates the metamorphosing dynamics of conflicts, the 
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externalities that sustains and makes conflicts possible and in case of Africa, that ‘context’ 
might actually not preclude historical realities of state formation, his question nonetheless 
touches the core of the tension between universalism and relativism. Raymond 
Shonholtz(2003) attempted to answer the question raised by Meadow in developing a general 
theory of conflict resolution applicable in different domains. According to Shonholtz (2003) 
the general theory on conflicts and disputes, situates conflicts and disputes within two 
different paradigmatic frameworks. Shonholtz assigns disputes to transitional and mature 
democracies and conflict to authoritarian regimes.  The first premise of this theory is that in 
democratic societies, there are no conflicts, rather only disputes. The second premise of this 
theory is that in authoritarian regimes there are only conflicts and politicised systems of 
settlements. On the other hand the general theory of conflicts and disputes situates disputes 
within democratic societies. Within such societies, Shonholtz argues that there are no 
conflicts. The Third Premise is that in international relations, national states can transform 
conflicts into disputes. Conflicts are those issues that lack a legitimate, reliable, transparent, 
non-arbitrary forum for the peaceful settlement of differences. Disputes, conversely, are pre-
described as having recognized forums for their expression and resolution that meet the 
above criteria. In short, conflicts lack a viable “container” for the routine management of 
differences. Based on Shonholtz postulation it wouldn’t be contradictory to reason and 
empirical evidence to assume that Rwanda has had both conflicts and disputes which have 
both become protracted over time. The three premises advanced by Shonholtz would be 
considered to apply to the long and protracted situation of Rwanda which has traversed 
different forms of political regimes. Rwanda as it stance would be considered a transitional 
democracy. Consequently the first premise of Shonholtz theory, wherein the situation of 
protracted conflict has been mitigated by democratic institutions into a dispute would explain 
the present situation in Rwanda. The second premise of Shonholtz theory would fit perfectly 
the period under the Habyarimana regime and the conflict resolution mechanisms attempted 
within the framework of the Arusha accords. The conflict resolution mechanisms adopted by 
the regime strived to settle differences through forms of repression, violence, avoidance, or 
ideology. The latter settlement mechanisms that were overseen by the UN could be seen as 
politicised system of settlements designed as compromises between the belligerents focused 
around power sharing. More-over, existing settlement mechanisms are always subject to 
political influence and accordingly politicized depending on the parties, issues, and regime 
interest. The interests of successive regimes in Rwanda were the politicization of ethnicity.  
With regards to the third premise of the general theory on conflicts and disputes, Blake 
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Morrant (1998) asserts that nation states live in a Hobbesian world which dictates that 
individuals or states would employ any means including violence to attain and defend power, 
possessions and reputation.  The argument that conflicts create the opportunity to 
democratize issues by limiting state power to an international regime or agreement 
prescribing how future matters will be settled fits squarely with the role the International 
Community through a system like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
can play in ‘democratising’ post genocide justice. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature review and theoretical framework describe, summarizes, evaluates, clarifies or 
integrates existing research related to the area of inquiry. The theory helps structure the 
analysis of the empirics in a logical manner. Amongst other purposes, literature review serves 
to identify gaps in the study area, avoid duplicating the work of others and increase the 
breadth of knowledge of the researcher, it provides the intellectual context of the study 
enabling the researcher to position the study in relation to other works. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. BACKGROUND FOR THE STUDY: 
Stedman argues that history was a science because it composed of facts which were events 
which resulted from the action of individuals producing them through the framework of 
institutions (Stedman 1972;98) 
3.1. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The genocide in 1994 was not a sudden eruption of anger which translated into targeted 
killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. These events were tied to historical developments that 
stretched beyond Rwanda’s recent history as an independent state. It is therefore logical to set 
the reader through this historical path as to establish a holistic picture on recent tensions and 
their impact on efforts at genuine reconciliation. 
Rwanda is a land lock country in Central Africa hemmed in the North and Northwest by 
Uganda. Sødenbaum and Taylor perceive Uganda as the epicentre of conflicts in the great 
lakes region (Søderbaum and Taylor 2007; 153).
7
 In the South of Rwanda is Burundi with its 
own dynamics of internal strife characterised by evolving tension between Hutus and Tutsis. 
This changing dynamic has been the barometer that records internal dynamics in Rwanda. At 
the Eastern border of Rwanda is Tanzania a base of former Ugandan rebels who overthrew 
the autocratic regime of Idi Amin and have since as explained above been the ideological 
godfathers of the present Rwandan government authorities. This geographic location has a 
socio-economic, political, demographic and security dynamic in the countries evolution. It is 
a complexity Sødebaum and Taylor describe as, micro-regionalism’.8 This micro-regionalism 
has its macro consequences best described as the threat to international peace and security 
caused by a pull and push effect beyond the intra-state nature of the conflict. Rwanda’s 
current population according to the CIA Fact book stands at 11 million inhabitants making it 
one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. 85% of Rwandans are ethnic Hutus, 
about 12 % ethnic Tutsis and barely 1% ethnic Twas.  
                                                          
7
Boås and Jennings in Søderbaum and Taylor (2007): 153 fighting a war of proxy in Sudan; 
involved in its own internal struggle with the Lord’s Resistance Army in the north; also 
involved in what is seen as Africa’s world war in the DRC and a former hoop and ideological 
mentor of former Rwandan rebel group, the RPF 
8…micro-regions appear on the continent in various guises: they might be sub-national or 
cross-border; formal or informal; economic, political, administrative, cultural and so 
forth…’The Dynamics of Cross Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa edited by Søderbaum 
and Taylor(2007) 
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3.1.1 COLONIAL PERIOD: 
Rwanda was ruled by Germany from 1897 to 1916. Following Germany’s defeat in World 
War 1, like most of its colonies, Rwanda was ceded to the victorious powers and in 1923 
became a League of Nations protectorate administered by Belgium. This mandate system 
conferred to the Belgians joint administration of Rwanda and Burundi as Rwanda-Urundu 
with the authority to govern it based on strict guidelines spelt out in the treaty of 
Versailles.
9
The idealist vision of the League of Nations was not in tangent with a statist 
realist interest driven world and could not survive the resurgence of a defiant Germany. Its 
failure to halt Hitler and Germany’s expansionist lust led to its demise. In 1946, the United 
Nations was formed and apart from its prime objective of maintaining international peace and 
security it also set itself a moral duty to hasten the decolonisation of dependent or non-self-
governing territories. Rwanda-Urundi became a UN Trust territory under Belgian rule in 
1946 governed by the principles of the UN Charter.
10
 Rwanda gained independence from 
Belgium in 1962.  
3.1.2. CHANGING SOCIAL DYNAMICS: 
The Belgian period of rule created an ethnic base system of governance in which the minority 
Tutsis controlled political power through entrenched feudal institutions and maintained a 
social hierarchical system that discriminated and exploited the majority Hutus. It was a 
system that translated into institutionalised curtailment in areas of education, landownership, 
job opportunities and instituted a form of patron-client relationship between the feudal 
institutions and the Hutu. Mambani (2002) argues that this form of rule led to the creation of 
a Hutu counter elite through three social locations; northern pre-independence Hutu elites 
forcibly incorporated into the Rwandan state and subjugated; the second was created through 
the introduction of a market economy, especially in Uganda and the Congo. The introduction 
of the market economy according to Mambani liberated the Hutus from the servitude inside 
Rwanda by expanding their labour opportunities beyond the borders of Rwanda itself. The 
market economy also introduced a certain degree of liberalisation which permitted Hutus to 
engage in agrarian production for export purposes. This became a great source of Hutu 
empowerment. This in a way challenge the social supremacy of the Tutsi partly derived 
through cattle ownership and consequently land control. The third area of the counter elite 
                                                          
9
Article 22 of Versailles Treaty of 1919 
10
 See Chapter XII Article 75 of The UN Charter 
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argument was education which helped to ‘erode the social supremacy of the Tutsi and opened 
the way for Hutus to question the political institutions as erected for its maintenance. The 
political institutions ensured the survival of the social supremacy which was in turn 
legitimated by the Belgian colonial administration operating in alliance with the churches. 
According to Prunier, Belgian colonial rule was under a dual pressure of the international 
community and the majority Hutus to democratise the institutions of power ( Prunier 95: 41-
54 quoted in Paris (2004). The struggle for decolonisation went hand in hand with the 
struggle to terminate what the majority Hutus perceived as a symbiotic coexistence between 
two arms of repression. They both manifested themselves as external and indigenous 
minority rule. The normative basis for this struggle though grounded in customary believe 
was expressed in the ‘majority declaration’ called the ‘the Bahutu Manifesto’ which called 
for the double liberation of the Hutu from both the Hamites and the Bazungu (Mambani 
2001;103-104). As Mambani aptly observed, the choice of the ‘Bahutu’, rather than the 
Rwanda manifesto was rooted in the Hutu believe that they were beyond just being an 
indigenous group which held claim to the land but they were the ‘nation’. Most scholars have 
highlighted several factors which made a Hutu revolt imminent. What I perceive is missing in 
the literature is a third force. This third force was a moral one happening far away from 
Rwanda. It was the desire by the capitalist block to assume a moral supremacy over the 
Communist block and consequently force it out of Eastern Europe. This could not happen if 
countries central to the capitalist block were still seen as occupying powers over distant 
lands. This moral rational translated into the 1960 UN declaration against colonial rule. As a 
UN Trust territory under Belgian rule, the Trustee was bound by Article 76 of the UN Charter 
on trust territories to administer the trust territory towards independence or self-rule.
11
 The 
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The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the 
United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:  
-to further international peace and security;  
-to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by 
the terms of each trusteeship agreement;  
-to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the 
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and  
-to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of 
the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the 
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duality of Belgian rule, its manipulation of identity to facilitate this rule and Tutsi domination 
through entrenched feudal institutions were all inconsistent with the spirit of the UN 
decolonisation agenda coded in the Trusteeship Charter. Although the desire to abandon 
direct rule was governed by a moral rationale, direct rule itself was governed by a duality of 
political and economic reasons. Consequently the Belgians instituted policies for 
administrative convenience which will set the stage for a violent cyclical alteration of power 
that began in 1959. 
3.1.3. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: 
In 1959 a Hutu revolt led to what Uvin describes as ‘localised anti-Tutsi violence and small 
pogroms’ and the 1960 and 1961 legislative elections which brought to power an anti-Tutsi 
party and the subsequent overthrow of the Monarchy sent thousands fleeing into 
neighbouring Uganda and Burundi. According to Paris, Tutsi resistance to Hutu rule 
continued in the following years which provoked waves of repression by the Hutu 
government (Paris, 2004;70). The first post-colonial republic under president Kayibanda 
chased out and killed most former Tutsi power holders and politicians as well as moderate 
Hutu politicians (Uvin 1999;6).
12
 The shift in political power and the termination of its source 
of sustenance did not only leave the minority Tutsis vulnerable but the effect of historical 
mythologies, identity reconstruction and ethnic manipulation that legitimated Tutsi rule was 
transformed into a source of Hutu fear that in turn legitimated repression of Tutsis. These 
tensions would continue into the second republic under Juvenal Habyarimana as impunity 
became the norm and institutionalised discrimination legitimated by a claim of fighting 
historical injustices. As Newbury argues, repression was not mainly on Tutsis but also on 
critical opponents of the regime from Hutu extraction.
13
The counter elite Mambani argues 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and 
subject to the provisions of Article 80.  
12
 Peter Uvin(1999). Ethnicity and power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass 
Violence: Comparative Politics Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 1999), pp. 253-271 
13
In the 1980s, Habyarimana adopted increasingly harsh measures against political 
opponents, including, most notably, many imprisoned leaders from the First Republic; the 
late 1980s saw a rash of political assassinations, often in the guise of car accidents. The 
targets of these murders - almost exclusively Hutu - were usually people seen as too critical 
of the regime; the courageous editor of Kinyamateka (a widely read weekly newspaper 
written in Kinyarwanda) and an outspoken, popular female Member of Parliament were 
among the victims. Catherine Newbury(1999)’ A catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested views of 
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created under the first and second republic installed a culture of impunity which was tolerated 
or at best promoted through legislation in the name of resisting Tutsi dominance and fighting 
for liberation from a dual historical injustice. These claims were not helped by trying to 
replace one repressive system by another. The toleration by both Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana of a culture of impunity directed principally against Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
resulted in a marriage of convenience between Tutsis mostly operating from exile and an 
internal Hutu opposition. The dual pressure on Habyarimana was raised in October 1990 
when a well organised and disciplined exiled based mainly Tutsi force invaded Rwanda from 
Uganda. Though this invasion was repelled with the help of France’s support, it nonetheless 
exposed the vulnerability of the structures of power and hardened the resolve of a small 
group of hardliners within the Habyarimana government to resolve to deal with its internal 
Tutsi support base.  
3.1.4. STRUCTURING A PEACE ACCORD: 
In August of 1993, following negotiations between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 
the Rwandan government, the then Organisation of African Union (OAU) mediated the 
signing of a cease fire agreement within the framework of the Arusha Peace Accord (APA). 
The Accord was a comprehensive peace agreement designed to bring the war between the 
RPF and the Rwandan government to an end.
14
 The Accord trumped national unity over 
ethnic or regional preferences and resolved the question of the return of Rwandan refugees. 
The focal point of the protocols and then the Accord was the formation of a transitional 
government to be headed by a prime minister, the integration of both armies, institution of 
plural democratic political order in which sovereignty rested with the people and in which the 
respect of human rights protected by the constitution but reflective of universal norms and 
values was guaranteed. Apart from the civilian monitoring regime composed of the parties to 
the Accord, and representatives of the countries that oversaw its signing were critical in its 
implementation. Also included was a military monitoring component sanctioned by UN 
Security Council Resolution(UNSC) 872 under a Chapter VI mandate of the UN Charter and 
included the establishment of the UN Assistant Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
15
The 
outline of the agreement was consistent with international demand for the liberalisation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ethnicity and genocide in Rwanda: Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2/3 pp. 
292-328 
14
 Article 1 of the APA 
15
 UNSC Res. 872(1993) 
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institutions of state which included what Paris (2004) calls the ‘democratisation and 
marketisation’ of the state. The marketization angle involved devaluation of the Rwandan 
currency, implementation of a strict Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) which involved 
reduction of the deficit, spending cuts, liberalisation of imports, elimination of subsidies for 
coffee producers. The democratisation angle involved the introduction of a multiparty plural 
society within which domestic political opposition could operate free from repression. It 
should also be noted that the price of coffee which provided almost two third of Rwanda’s 
foreign revenue had plummeted (Paris 2004;7). The consequences of these changes; the 
economic pressures caused by the war, the marketization demands of Multilateral institutions 
and the political compromises in ending the war according to Newbury were also the “major 
factor in the growing schism within the government itself”.  
3.1.5. THE GRADUAL UNRAVELLING OF THE ACCORD: 
The schism alluded to by Newbury further weakened the Habyarimana government and 
threatened the premise of the Arusha Accords and its protocols. As Uvin explains, the regime 
was under attack from all fronts and its most radical factions took recourse in the usual time-
tested solution: the revival of ethnicity steered by the ‘small house’ headed by the president’s 
own wife (Uvin 199;9). The Akazu became an ideological setting whose legitimacy rested on 
a fluid and skewed foundation that would be used all through the genocide. The Akuza 
derived its legitimation in terminating Tutsi power which was defeated in the 1959 
revolution. The hardliners perceived the Arusha Accords as capitulation and the provision of 
a soft landing spot for Tutsis bent on reclaiming political power. It was a claim they 
effectively transformed into a propaganda tool to instil fear into their Hutu base. The birth of 
Hutu power Mambani argues was designed as an organised political tendency alongside a 
comprehensive propaganda effort meant at discrediting Habyarimana’s effort at 
reconciliation(Mambani 2002;190). Once discredited, Habyarimana became a seating dock 
for both the Akazu and the RPF. In April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana and the 
president of Burundi was shot down over Kigali.
16
 The circumstances of the downing of this 
plane still remains shrouded in controversy and the power vacuum Habyarimana’s demise 
created would be immediately filled by the hardliners opposed to the Arusha Accords.
17
 The 
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 See appendix 1 for a Communique by victims of the plane crash on its 18
th
 anniversary 
17
 A recent report issued by a French on January 10, 2012 contested a former report by judge 
Jean Luis Brugiere which accused the current Rwandan president of having brought down the 
plane of president Habyarimana. The findings were based on the presumed origin of the 
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Hutu hardliners spread out within the presidential guard, Interahamwe militias, the youth 
wing of the ruling Hutu party, began executing anyone whose identity cards identified them 
as Tutsis(Holzgrefe  & Keohane (eds) 2003;15). In less than three months, an estimated 
number of about 800.000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus who declared their sympathy with the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) were slaughtered (Pottier 2002;9). An estimated 43,000 
Tutsis were killed in Karama Gikongoro, a further 100,000 massacred in Butare; over 16,000 
people were killed in around Cyangugu; 4000 in Kibeho; 5,500 in Cyahinda; 2,500 in 
Kibungo.
18
Mamdani (2002) observes that unlike the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide was 
not carried out in a distance; in remote concentration camps beyond national boarders…it 
was as he contends executed with the slash of machetes(Mambani 2002;5). The proximity 
between the perpetrator and the victim throws an interesting dilemma in post genocide 
reconciliation.   
Staub argues that the non-spontaneous nature of genocide during which both victims and 
perpetrator undergo a gradual transformation characterised by dehumanisation and 
intoxication respectively (Staub 1989;15)
19
 creates an interesting dilemma in any post 
conflict society. This progressive nature of human transformation explains the underlying 
reasons why fixing a society that has suffered the scars of genocide, demands a meticulous 
and time consuming reordering of society in a way that unwraps and exposes the past for 
what it was and reconstructing a future based on mutual trust. Mamdani summed the 
genocide and the challenges as follows: if Rwanda was the genocide that happened, then 
South Africa was the genocide that didn’t…if South Africa has millions of beneficiaries and 
few perpetrators, Rwanda has perpetrators at least in their hundreds of thousands and few 
beneficiaries (Mamdani 2002;185). It is the nature of the genocide, its rationalisation based 
on fear that makes post genocide reconciliation a complicated enterprise. Rwanda and the 
international community have since 1995 engaged in a triad process of accountability as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
missile that brought down the plane of Habyarimana. The enquiry concluded that the missile 
originated from the Kanombe hill which had a military base of the FAR; The French foreign 
minister Alain Jupe responded to the new findings with ‘on prende 
act’http://www.pacificfreepress.com/news/1-/10662-judge-jean-louis-bruguiere-is-alive-and-
well-and-in-the-news-again.html accessed 15.01.2012 
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 Alison Des Forges in ‘Leave no one to tell the story quoted by Holzgrefe 
19Genocide and mass killings do not directly arise from difficult life conditions and their 
psychological effects. There is a progression along a continuum of destruction…victims are 
further devalued…perpetrators change and become more able and willing to act more against 
victims. In the end people develop powerful commitment to genocide or to an ideology that 
supports it. 
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way of ending the country’s culture of impunity, helping it deal with its past and fostering 
reconciliation as a healing process. This triad system of justice dispensation under the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), national courts and the Gacaca traditional 
system of justice follows the dual track of retributive and restorative justice mechanism 
respectively. The ICTR which is based in Arusha Tanzania has brought into custody alleged 
key planners of the genocide
20
 rendered important judgement on the genocide which have 
been key to the discourse of genocide as a whole.
21
 On the other hand the domestic process of 
dealing with the culture of impunity and rendering justice has been a source of tension 
between the need for justice and reconciliation. This tension is exacerbated by the backlog of 
unresolved historical issues raised at the beginning of this section and the ever evolving 
tension on the definition of genocide. It is all together befitting to begin the next section in 
addressing the competing positions on the discourse of genocide which I think is important if 
not critical for post genocide justice and reconciliation.  
3.2. CONSTRUCTING THE GENOCIDE DISCOURSE: 
The way the genocide discourse is framed challenges the individual culpability regime of 
criminal responsibility that has defined most post conflict justice regimes. It is a discourse 
framed around intent, purpose and physical elimination of an ‘indelible’ group.  It has been 
related in social theory to both social and political structure: i.e., ethnoclass exclusion and 
discrimination and types of polities undertaken by mostly authoritarian regimes (Fein 
1993;79).
22
 The aftermath of the 1994 genocide erected what most Hutus describe as another 
ethnoclass authoritarian regime that established a post genocide justice mechanism grounded 
in ‘victor justice’ This section is dedicated to framing that discourse and to relate its 
limitations and strength in the on-going discussion about accountability after massive 
violations of human rights.  
Genocide is both a sociological and legal terminology conceptualised as a narrative 
constructed to encompass different interrelated concepts. Its state centric definition rooted in 
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a world seen through a realist lens negates the dynamic nature of human relationship 
compounded by dynamic identities, waning cloak of sovereignty and technological 
advancement.  Genocide has been a subject matter that has interested psychologists, 
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, legal scholars and even historians. As a legal 
category, the 1948 Convention for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
defines the crime of genocide in its Art. II. The ictr and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) have developed a huge pool of case law that helps bring more clarity to 
the legal definition.   
As a sociological concept it has been well researched by Scholars like Fein (1990, 1993b,), 
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) Kuper (1981, 1983), Staub (1989), Power(2007), Charny(1999).  
 
3.2.1 CONSTRUCTING THE CRIME: 
Raphael Lemki constructed the word genocide by combining the Greek word genos (tribe, 
race) and the Latin word cide (killing of). The 1948 genocide convention transformed it into a 
legal category within which ethnicity and intent played a central role in its determination. 
Hintjens submits that in any attempt to explain something as complex as the genocide in 
Rwanda, parallels with other situations of mass state murder are unavoidable. Beyond 
parallels, theoretical explanation to mass murder gives a macro perspective into those 
conditions that make such events not only possible but sometimes unavoidable. Though 
conscious that the disparities and the dissimilarities between them must limit, if not render 
dubious any attempts to find common characteristics or at least common causations to them, 
it is reasonable to pursue macro-explanations to consistent pattern of events that sometimes 
stubbornly defy the logic of micro explanations. 
 
3.2.2. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CRIME:  
In relation to human rights or human rights abuse Bauman Zygmunt illustrates how such a 
model gets us to understand genocide with his work on the Holocaust. He looked at society 
concentrating largely on factors internal to it. We know already Baumann argues that the 
institutions responsible for the Holocaust, even if found criminal, were in no legitimate 
sociological sense pathological or abnormal (Baumann 1989; 19). On the other hand 
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Baumann as a functionalist contends that the Holocaust was the product of modernity. Of 
course modernity has perfected killing and abstraction which diminishes moral responsibility; 
set in place bureaucratic machinery then employs rational thoughts but this argument fails to 
explain the Rwanda genocide that was rudimentary at its best. Bauman argues that the spirit 
of instrumental rationality and its modern bureaucratic form of institutionalisation did not 
only make the Holocaust possible but ‘emminently reasonable’. Yet it is also acceptable that 
instrumental rationality became a latter Nazi design only in 1941 after they had failed to use 
ethnic cleansing as a way of building a German Reich free of Jews.  Rwanda throws in an 
interesting dimension in the modernity mass killing argument. Like Germany, it has been 
argued that almost a generation of pogroms, massacres and targeted killings was unable to 
deal with what the Hutus perceived as the ‘Tutsi problem’. Consequently instrumental 
rationality which is based on using the end to justify the means seem to have been the best 
approach of the ‘small house’ to end Tutsi mythological and inherent right as a group ‘born to 
rule’. Of course this could only hold true if the decision was physical elimination of the 
Tutsis. And as Baumann argues the utilisation of the bureaucratic machinery vested in the 
state made this enterprise even much easier. My interest in Bauman’s explanation flows from 
his attempt to establish causality between institutions and the people who worked in it. This is 
an argument Giddens frames as the agency structure relationship which he underscores as an 
immutable reciprocating feature in shaping agency and structural action i.e. both the medium 
and the outcome of practices which constitute social systems (Sewell 1992;4).
23
 What 
modernity took away from Nazi Germany, it did same for the State of Rwanda. Economic 
and political liberalism as two of the cornerstone of the modern state was a liberating force 
for the Hutus as it was to Germany and challenged the state-centric monopoly that defined 
Hutu domination of Rwanda’s society. This is the same monopoly Hutus attributes to the 
current structure of power centred on Kagame. It is this autocracy that defines the post 
genocide justice architecture in a way Hutus claim has the potential of wrecking the fragile 
peace the country currently enjoys. 
On another count Fein argues that genocide may lead to war and war may lead to genocide. 
She particularly cited the situation of ‘lostwars’ as instrumental to the genocidal project 
which is premised on the destruction of groups labelled as aliens within (Fein 1993;84). Fein 
once more argues that there is a similarity in genocidal killings which lies in the ideologies of 
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national homogeneity dictating the choice of victims and she explains, this follows with the 
exclusion of the victim group from the universe of moral obligation of the perpetrator.  
Rwanda thus challenges Fein’s argument. This is a case study where the victim was part and 
parcel of the universe of moral obligation of the perpetrator. Despite persistent and systematic 
forms of discrimination under Rwanda’s post-independence republics which amounted to a 
certain degree to social exclusion, there is enough evidence to show that both ethnic groups 
were connected at least from a bottom up perspective. In this connection some have argued 
makes the genocide itself difficult to rationalise and post genocide reconciliation an 
enterprise of near insurmountable proportion. 
Palmer weighs in with the colonial argument by positing that the main difference between 
colonial and modern genocide is that in the former the victim is excluded from the perpetrator 
group prior to exclusion. In Rwanda both the perpetrator and victim were integrated within 
the same socio-economic and political structures. According to Palmer’s theory the Tutsis 
would have been considered to be both an obstacle and a threat to the perpetrator society and 
viewed with fear (Palmer 1998;95).
24
 Consequently post-colonial influence kept Rwanda 
permanently divided along multiple interest lines.  
Newbury & Newbury (1999) sets this argument into a clearer framework by stressing the 
failure of the nature of the post-colonial state and the changing configuration of regional, 
class and ethnic divisions in Rwanda in addressing the concerns of ordinary Rwandans. 
Kuper becomes more specific on the structural basis for genocide when he posits that the 
plural society which is consistent with the presence of diversity of racial, ethnic and or 
religious groups in which genocide is defined as a crime committed against these groups. But 
what are those conditions that support either argument of genocidal massacre?  
The dominant perspective O’Byrne contends appears to have emerged from the Weberian 
tradition which emphasises the role of the centralised authoritarian state in modern societies 
and the existence of conflicting groups within the plural society.  The plural society argument 
hinges on the assumption that only in heterogeneous ethno class societies can the sociological 
and legal definitions of genocide apply. For it is in such societies in which persistent 
discrimination, marginalisation are institutionalised that rebellion by the ‘other’ leads to the 
possibility of genocides. The Rwandan genocide has been explained on several grounds. Yet 
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like the Holocaust which happened more than sixty years ago, there is hardly any consensus 
on what actually caused the genocide.  None of the arguments advanced in explaining the 
genocide has independently captured the cause(s) of the Rwandan conflict, its resilience and 
the difficulties associated with its resolution, accommodation or transformation for beneficial 
purposes. That is why Zartmann’s question on the sequential, phasal or concomitant nature of 
conflicts (Zartmann 2005) strikes an interesting chord with my approach to the Rwandan 
conflict. Consequently, looking at the genocide debate first through Zartmann’s postulation 
of creed argument is very important.  Fisher (1990) defines a creed conflict as one that 
revolves around incompatible preferences, principles or practices that people believe in and 
are invested in with reference to their group identity. The Rwandan conflict is thus at times 
situated within this realm of value tension and consequently described as an ethnic conflict 
conducted along the defence of sometimes immutable identities. This argument is re-enforced 
by the fundamental premise underlying the definition of the crime of genocide.  It is a 
supposition advanced by Newbury and rejected by Mamdani (2002).  
3.2.3. THE INDIVIDUAL PROPENSITY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE: 
Psychoanalytical explanation of genocide has characterised the works of scholars like Ervin 
Staub in genocide and mass killings, Peter Uvin in prejudices, crisis and genocide in Rwanda 
in which he attempts to answer the question of how do situations come about in which people 
massively participate in massive violence against their neighbours who have not harmed 
them. Parsons uses the plant analogy to argue that human development is a function of 
genetic constitution. Consequently, he argues, his interaction with his environment is not the 
fundamental determinant of his personality.  This line of argument fits squarely with the 
Hobbesian notion of inherent and immutable character of human cruelty borne out of the 
necessity of self-preservation. Beyond the individual accountability which Hobbes attributes 
to innate characteristic is the necessity of social contract that gave rise to a strong centralised 
state to protect individuals. The agency structure rational advanced by Parsons and Hobbes 
does not explain why genocide above all other crimes is chosen by perpetrators. In a 
background paper published by the United Nations Economic Commission of Europe 
(UNECE) on aggressive driving behaviour, the paper explains the causes of aggressive 
driving behaviour. The paper began by exploring the different theoretical arguments to 
aggressive behaviour. From innate human character to the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
which focuses on external factors, the paper argues that situations that ‘impede or prevent 
some form of goal-directed behaviour are believed to act as a catalyst for aggressive 
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behaviour’. Another argument advance to explain this phenomenon is territoriality. Human 
beings, the paper argues are ‘naturally prone to territoriality and have the tendency to view 
their vehicles as an extension of their personal domains and consequently feel threatened by 
other vehicles and respond aggressively or out of an instinct of self-protection.’  The 
arguments advance in this paper revolves around two suppositions. The first already reviewed 
follows the innate biological argument inherent in human desire of protection, preservation 
and survival; an impulse towards the protection of a goal. In this argument aggression is thus 
rationalised as a survival instinct. Consequently humans will act aggressively out of fear and 
the desire to protect their own or their kind from the defined other. This is the ‘conflict 
centric’ argument advanced throughout this study by most Hutu respondents.   The second 
supposition drawn from this paper revolves around autonomy and the preservation of 
cohesive attributes between groups. Muench (2004) argues along this line that conflict with 
the other only strengthens the border, membership, values, norms and the interactive patterns 
of the group members. Consequently, he argues, conflict is thus a method of defining the 
identity of one group against the other to be confirmed.  As we all know all conflicts or acts 
of aggression do not lead to positive outcomes. The paper on aggressive driving behaviour 
stressed the consequences of the innate or external influence attitude on road safety and 
environmental protection. The individual capacity for aggression that leads to crimes like 
genocide can thus be an issue of life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos). It is 
these essentialist explanations of human character that informed Adorno’s theory of the 
‘authoritarian personality’ which sort to explain why the Holocaust happened. It stressed the 
need for unquestionable obedience to authority. Mika Fatouros (1979) in answering the 
question of what makes the torturer stresses the important role of external factors and used 
the Greek dictatorship between 1967 and 1974 to argue that torturers are not sadistic but 
ordinary people who have been remoulded, refashioned.  Urvin thus concluded that racist 
prejudice as a structural feature in Rwandan society had socio-psychological functions for the 
peasant masses. These psycho-sociological factors epitomised by peer pressure and structural 
issues can only be seen as contributing factors to what I perceive as material and ideational 
structural questions of competing claims in a society that is struggling to define itself. 
What is clear here is that constructing the conflict frame can be very challenging. Without a 
proper framing of the conflict, the motivation of individuals and the structural situations that 
permit such crimes, it would be extremely difficult to construct any justice institution to deal 
with its fallouts. 
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Chapter Four 
4. DELINEATION OF THEMATIC AREAS:  
It will be difficult to understand the present post conflict justice regime without having a 
deeper understanding of the possible underlying rational that informed its choice and scope. 
These rational are not specific to Rwanda but because the domestic political history of 
Rwanda is invariably linked to international socio-economic and political situations,  a 
broader understanding of these thematic areas might help narrow the scope on the realities of 
the situation under investigation. I have carefully selected these four thematic areas based on 
their recurrent nature in the discussion about Rwanda. The literature under review here will 
include desktop data and field interviews. The conflict in Rwanda received an ethnic tagging 
in its early days. Pietese argues that this misperception is due to anti-popular imagery going 
back to crowd theory and the assumption of popular disorganization… (Athina & Andrew 
2010; 246). While ethnicity may have been a factor in the conflict, it remains to be proven 
that the war between the RPA and the FAR was an ethnic one. This perception of things has 
filtered down into the post genocide justice arrangement as Hutus allege that ‘justice’ comes 
down to them in ethnic clothing. Apart from ethnicity, there is little doubt that the way the 
genocide Convention was framed some fifty or more years ago has shaped the way post 
conflict justice mechanisms are organized. The 1948 Convention frames genocide in a very 
narrow way and excludes other victims of war. A better understanding of this definition, its 
limitations and possible effect on post genocide justice in Rwanda is important in capturing 
its impact on reconciliation. During the conflict, the United Nations got heavily involved in 
brokering a peace agreement between the belligerents. Despite the UN presence in Rwanda, 
massacres were ongoing as the hardliners opposed to a peace settlement were bent on its 
failure. It is clear that the United Nations failed in its role and the consequences of this failure 
was the death of hundreds of thousands of people. Understanding the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, its historical application, why it failed in Rwanda and the consequences that 
failure has on the post genocide justice system is vital. Lastly, I will review the current 
literature of Post conflict justice mechanisms with a particular focus on the Gacaca and the 
ICTR. There are several factors that influence the selection of a particular form of post 
conflict justice arrangement. The effect of such an arrangement on the notion of 
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reconciliation is vital and this can only be captured by an extensive understanding of the way 
Rwanda’s post genocide justice works. 
 
4.1. THE ETHNIC DIVIDE 
 
Rwanda’s history is mired in intense debate. It is one contested by both scholastic writings 
that research Rwanda’s history as a precursor to the genocide and the Rwandans themselves. 
The reason Urvin (2007) argues lies in the absence of a ‘consensual scientific knowledge’ 
partly due to inherent difficulties in recreating a history of oral societies, as well as the 
distortion introduced by the Eurocentric and sometimes outright racist account by the first 
colonizers…’. It is an argument Mudimbe (1988) takes further in ascribing to the racist or 
what Urvin describes as the Eurocentrism of historical discourses that perceives the continent 
as one of ‘metaphors through which the West represents the origins of its own norms, 
develops a self-image and integrates this image into the set of signifiers asserting what it 
supposes to be its identity (Mbembe 2002;2). Apart from empirical and historical contestation 
of history, theoretical models on identity and ethnicity add to the confusion on the 
relationship and differences between the Hutus and Tutsis. Ethnicity and its relationship to 
ethnic conflict have also inflated the literature with varying rational to explain specific 
conflicts. 
 
Omeje argues that primordialism is largely a western-centric paradigm that perceives the 
proliferation of conflicts in Africa as a ‘primordial inevitability’ rooted in the underlying 
phenomenological features and differences among the heterogeneously bunched together by 
colonial diktat to form sovereign states(David 2008;71). This framework sees identity as 
inherent in fixed and immutable characteristics of individuals rooted in biology. On the 
question of fixed identities Lake and Rothschild (1998) argue that identity is rooted in 
biology and an ‘extensive history of practices and tradition that makes ones identity 
unalterable’ (Lake & Rothschild 1998; 5). Its focus in contextualising rather than 
operationalizing ethnicity and its relation to conflict makes it to my opinion an insufficient 
framework in analysing the Hutu/Tutsi conflict. It may be a reasonable assertion to make 
about immutable identity which of course one would hardly argue but alone an immutable 
biological characteristic like colour could hardly have been a definite determinant. 
Instrumentalists on the other hand predicate identity as a dynamic phenomenon subject to 
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manipulation by conscious political elites. This is an assertion the Rwanda National Congress 
(RNC) wholly subscribes to. In its 23 page declaration of core values it argues thus; 
 
“The horrendous violence and suffering that Rwanda has experienced have always been 
masterminded and organized by political leaders as a strategy of strengthening their grip onto 
power…and have fuelled sectarian divisions merely to cover-up their political plans to 
monopolize political power”(RNC 2010;7) 
 
Howard and Rothman (1999) in justifying their instrumentalists’ stance argue that the human 
capacity to form distinct groups is rooted in their evolutionary history and more recent 
experiences and debunk the inevitability notion of conflict advance by the primordialist 
school of thought (Rothman and Howard 1999:5). For one thing they argue, “we are 
persuaded that there are many contexts in which different groups live peacefully for relatively 
long periods of time…and there are cases where intense enemies find ways to end their 
quarrels and establish patterns of coexistence in previously strife-torn regions”(Ibid;5). The 
notion of human conflict as rooted in human nature buys into the Hobbesian argument of 
inherent human cruelty for self-preservation and the inevitability of conflict. This argument 
of course negates the rationality that informs genocide and the exploitative nature of human 
interest in choosing genocide as a way of resolving conflict. Instrumentalists, Omeje argues 
do not contest the existence of primordial characteristics within ethnic groups, but as this 
school contends, this existence on its own does not naturally result in violent conflicts. 
Primordial factors he argues instigate and affect conflicts only to the extent that they are 
deliberately manipulated and politicised by political actors and local elites, usually for their 
self-seeking advantages.  To the extent that this is true, the association of the genocide with 
the Akazu,
25
 could lend credit to the instrumentalist school of thought. Gatwa (2005;8-9)
26
, 
Mamdani (2002;87-88)
27
 all uphold the notion of the construction and instrumentalization of 
identity as pivotal in the institutionalization of what Gatwa describes as the basis of changes 
in socio-political and cultural relations. 
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 Also known as the ‘little house’, the Akazu was an elite group at the head of which was 
Agathe Kanziga; see Melvern 2009 
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 ‘What had been social classes the Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa were gradually transformed 
into ethnic groups’  
27
 ‘The racialization of the Tutsis/Hutu was not simply an intellectual construct…moreover 
racialization was also an institutional construct. It is this political institutional fact that 
intellectuals alone would not be able to alter’. Belgian power turned Hamitic racial 
supremacy from an ideology into an institutional fact by making it the basis of changes in 
political, social, and cultural relations; 
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Respondent C concurs with this characterization by asserting that; 
‘Rwanda before was a society of social classes until colonialists turned it into an ethnic 
society that fuelled antagonism…’ 
 
Mamdani and Gatwa further describe this instrumentalisation in a way that further challenges 
the immutability thesis of primordialism. The Hamitic hypothesis offers an example of how 
traditional economic and social differences can be reified into perceived immutable 
differences (Adelman 2005; 24). The Hamitic hypothesis
28
 that translates mythologies into 
social facts is upheld by colonial institutions in a way that upholds the Tutsis as a civilising 
group whose origin is external (Gatwa 2005;81)
29
. It is this same externality hailed by 
Belgian colonialist as depicting Tutsi supremacy which makes them “destine are regner” that 
was used as a factor in Hutu claim of indigenous origin. The same report raised the spectre of 
racial similarity between Hutu and Tutsi as an unfortunate aspect of some ‘declasses’ whose 
blood isn’t pure anymore. Newbury throws in an important dimension to the triad perspective 
of primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism by explaining ethnicity as identity 
contextually configured (Newbury 1999:4).
30
As Johan Pottier (2000) contends, Hutu labour 
force associated with the institutions created by King Rwabugiri “undermined the livelihood 
security of Hutu commoners and made survival more difficult”. It was, he contends through 
‘labour prestation’ that social relations between the two groups took on a strong ethnic 
character before European colonists arrived (ibid; 13). This ethniticisation of labour and 
consequently the relationship between the two groups made social mobility difficult and thus 
brings to question the existentialists’ supposition about ethnicity. As Newbury explains, king 
Rwabugiri made this categorization more static or what she describes as being ‘rigified’. 
Johan thus argues that wealth and not race informed the categorisation into Tutsi or Hutu. 
Most people treated the Rwandan genocide as an ethnic conflict. From the perspective of 
scholarly articulations, policy orientation, the conflict in Rwanda has been described from 
tribal resentments to a usual African practice of brutal slaughter. Pottier argues that the 
Rwandan bloodbath was not tribal (Pottier 2002:9). Rather he argues, it was distinctively 
modern tragedy, a degenerated class conflict minutely prepared and callously executed; a 
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 The Tutsi are another people…the Tutsi of good race has, apart from colour, nothing of a 
negro1925 race report  
30
 Ethnicity they argue is best understood not as an enduring, unchanging elements to social 
formations, nor as an instantaneous, recent invention…rather it is seen as an identity 
contextually configured, one which can be understood only through close familiarity with the 
history of social relations and political power’ 
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shamelessly twisted ethnic argument for the sake of class privilege (Ibid;9). These 
descriptions alone whether viewed through empirics, case study or theory does not 
adequately capture the historical and contemporary discourses on post genocide Rwanda. 
Ethnicity whether primordial, constructed or instrumentalised has fizzled itself either by 
omission or commission into the post genocide arrangements. Respondent A claims that his 
name features on Kagame’s list of those to be assassinated. We met under a tense atmosphere 
in the German capital of Berlin. He argues that for true reconciliation to happen; 
“We need an ICTR in Arusha which is not politicised, which is independent; charges Tutsis 
also; not the RPF kind of justice…for true reconciliation Hutu victims must be remembered 
and Tutsis perpetrators must be brought to justice…” 
By making ethnicity the central focus of their critic on the way post genocide justice 
arrangements are made, Hutus have recast the debate on the old rivalry that has followed 
Rwanda’s difficult transition from colonial to self-rule. Consequently by their assertion most 
Hutus have seen the ICTR and Gacaca as instruments of Tutsi domination. The most 
compelling argument against the Gacaca is its perceived role as an institution designed to 
prosecute the vanquished. This system of victors’ justice is seen by most respondents as 
biased, partial, based on retribution of the Hutus. The organisation of such an institution 
based on victor-vanquished dichotomy they argue fosters acrimony between the two peoples. 
Respondent B was a former prosecutor of the ICTR before escaping to exile where he is now 
an executive member of the RNC. 
“It is an abomination on all lines established to destroy part of the society…”(Respondent B) 
During my field trip, I was astonished by how many Hutus were conscious of the exact way 
the genocide Convention is framed. Even more exciting was the fact that most followed with 
deep interest the proceedings in Arusha. I could only conclude that they were interested in 
using its shortcomings to buttress their case that either there was no genocide in Rwanda or if 
there was one, there was ‘double genocide’. 
“If there was genocide in Rwanda there was double genocide” (Respondent A)  
That is why the next section will focus on the impact the legalisation and criminalisation of 
what evolved as a sociological concept had and is having on the country’s effort at 
establishing order through justice. 
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4.2. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CODIFICATION OF GENOCIDE: 
The nature of international treaties means they are product of negotiations, subject to 
derogation and reservation. Such negotiations lead to compromises in content, scope and area 
of applicability. While in 1948 the Genocide Convention was the product of compromises by 
the victorious powers of WWII, its universal criminality, assumption of a jus cogens status
31
 
and viewed as a crime under customary international law has given it added scope.
32
 Despite 
these developments within the jurisprudence of various ad hoc tribunals the Convention as 
defined in 1948 still remains a source of great criticism. The debate about the limitation of 
the scope of this definition is usually derived in part from the scale of the atrocities that gave 
rise to the terminology and the moral, legal and political implications a more broadened 
definition would have had on the victorious powers of WWII. The ‘uniqueness’ of the 
Holocaust has made the application of genocide on other atrocities quite limited. A focus on 
these limitations and its implication on the ICTR and Gacaca systems will throw more light 
on its implication on reconciliation. 
Rosenbaum (1996) on the Holocaust as well as on perspectives on comparative genocide 
asked a fundamental question; was the holocaust unique? First used by Polish Jurist Raphael 
Lemkin in 1944, he defined genocide as ‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating 
the groups themselves’. Lemkin’s definition finds resonance in the National Socialist 
Workers Party (NSDAP) doctrine that saw the nation rather the state as its central focus. In 
its original formulation Lemkin defined genocide in line with the several practices undertaken 
by the German state designed to achieve the objective of undermining the foundation of other 
nations. The corresponding limitations following codification exclude other entities defined 
by economic class, political affiliation or sexual preference. This exclusion has been one of 
the sources of great criticism of the convention. Drost slammed the exclusion by arguing that 
such exclusions leave a ‘…dangerous loophole for any government to escape the human 
duties under the Convention…’ (Fein 1990; 5). This is an argument that fits well when one 
considers the implications of the non-cooperation by the current Rwandan government with 
the ICTR. This non-cooperation has translated into the exclusion of possible RPF war 
criminals from the proceedings of the court and has strengthened the argument of respondent 
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 Prosecutor vs.  Servashago (Case No. ICTR-98-39-5) Sentence, February 2, 1999, 15, 
where genocide is described as ‘the crime of crimes’ 
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 Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR 964-T), Trial Chamber I, 2 September 1998. 
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B that the court operates around the premise defined by the victors. Charny on the other hand 
argues that the limitation translates into ignoring 100,000 to 500,000 Indonesian Communists 
killed between 1965 and 1966, 1.8 million Khmer Rouge killings in 1975-1979(Charny 
1999;12). Fein (1990) argues that the limitation excludes one of the fundamental units of 
society. Staub advances a contrary argument which posits that such limitations have the 
potential of complicating cases of genocide by apportioning them different names as in 
politicide. It is such a fear that helps explain the negation of thousands of Hutu killed by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Kuper suggests that for genocide to occur there must be a 
state, a position preferred by Chalk and Jonassohns as ‘state and other authorities’ or 
perpetrators (Fein 1990;12). These positions narrow the agent or perpetrator as defined by 
Article IV of the Convention. These are some of the structuralist arguments that challenge the 
codified definition that relies on some essentialist notion of innate wickedness and intent. 
Fein defines it in a way that addresses the limitation as ...sustained purposeful action (intent 
as in the UNGC) by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity...’(Fein 1993;24)  By 
using collectivity, Fein negates the limited scope of the UNGC and the genocide case law that 
defines that collectivity in a narrow ‘indelible centric’ manner33. Kuper (1981) argues against 
the exclusion of political groups; an argument which if followed would have excluded 
Polpots victims as genocide victims and the thousands of Hutus killed in refugee camps as 
victims of genocide. The implication would have obviously been a post genocide justice that 
takes away the perception of a victims/victors’ justice system. In view of this limitation in 
definition Rummel coined democide to encompass all groups whether delible or indelible; a 
coinage which took away the ambiguity provided by the UNGC’s assertion of in “part or in 
whole”. Harff and Gur coined an entirely different word to rationalise killings that target 
political groups apparently agreeing with Kuper’s argument. Drost addresses the issues of 
partial or whole destruction and group identity by positing genocide as “deliberate destruction 
of physical life” by virtue of membership of any human collectivity’. Chalk and Jonassohn 
(1990) have argued that group identity is defined by the perpetrator in their quest for their 
destruction…Katz(1994) defined genocide as “the actualization of intent, however 
successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, 
political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by 
whatever means. Jones describes proponents of the soft approach to the definition as 
important in seeing a “…dynamic and evolving genocide framework, rather than a static and 
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inflexible one” (Jones 2006;19). Tatz (2003) argues for genocide to be categorised into levels 
when he asserts that genocide is not a flat word that covers, equally, all systematic attempts to 
attack the essential foundations and institutions of a targeted people; a proposition seen as 
consistent with the different level of categorisation by the Rwandan organic law
34
 to try and 
punish those responsible for the genocide. “In my view, killing large numbers of people 
without the apparent purpose of eliminating the whole group is best regarded as mass killing. 
The purpose of mass killing may be to eliminate the leadership of a group, or to intimidate 
the group, and in general to re-establish dominance” (Staub 1989). This definition reflects the 
position expressed by kagame in debunking Hutu claim that there was some systematic 
process at eliminating the Hutus as an ethnic group. On the other hand all through my 
interviews with Hutu exiles there was across the board acceptance that the killing of Hutus 
was systematic.
35
 The targeting in a systematic way of people for the purpose of elimination 
for simply belonging to a group defined as the other did not begin with the Holocaust. The 
Armenian genocide which has recently been given a new thrust by the French parliament also 
followed a similar pattern even though not of the scale of the Holocaust.  
The decision to codify this crime into law in a state centric world meant certain compromises 
and reservations had to be worked out to get it through the scrutiny of many countries. It is 
these reservations and compromises that seem to pose the greatest challenge to adjudicating 
the prohibitions of war and to find middle grounds between the perpetrators and victims. 
Most conflicts which end by collapse can employ the spirit of the Convention to the letter 
without any fear of domestic resistance. The Rwandan conflict ended by ‘retreat’. This means 
that though the former regime collapsed from within, it regrouped in exile in both a political 
as well as a military force. The retreat of the regime and millions of Hutus who were either 
conducted or forced to flee with the fighting force were targeted by the RPA. This continued 
into the Congo resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands of Hutus. Because the 
Convention is codified to exclude what is now known as ‘genocidal massacres’, this means 
Hutu victims may not find justice within the framework of the present post genocide justice 
system. As it is argued latter, genocide is not the only crime being looked into by the 
domestic and ICTR jurisprudences. The problem with the ICTR is its inability to receive the 
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 Respondent B argues that ‘What happened in Rwanda cannot be termed as genocide 
according to the genocide convention…if there was genocide in Rwanda, then there was 
double genocide…Tutsis being killed because they were Tutsis and Hutus were also killed 
because they were Hutus.(field notes)Philipe also argues that ‘Arusha judges one side and not 
the other which has committed war crimes’.(fieldnotes) 
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cooperation needed from Rwanda to investigate RPA officers. This non-cooperation dealt 
with earlier would be rationalised based on several grounds including the lack of intervention 
to protect Tutsis during the genocide.   
Some have argued that the failure to intervene in Rwanda was due to the difficulty in 
establishing whether genocide was really happening. As I argue below, genocide is not void 
of its overarching notions of intent, organisation and the definition of the other. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in introducing the 
concept of R2P in 2001 distinguished between prevention and protection (ICISS 2001;xi). At 
the time of the genocide the UN was already engaged in ‘root cause’ issues through the 
Arusha peace accord. It failed in ‘direct prevention’ measures. Decisions to intervene follow 
a political rather than a legal process. And in a world of competing interest, soft and hard 
goals underpinning any decision to intervene and the, Morgadishu’ experience seemed to 
have strengthen the position of the bystander.  
 
4.3. THE INTERVENTION THAT NEVER WAS 
The competing claims and definition attributed with the crime of genocide highlights the 
moral and legal dilemma underpinning intervention and how such dilemmas have influenced 
the post genocide justice system in Rwanda and consequently seems to be affecting post 
genocide reconciliation. Once genocide is ascertain to be happening member states signatory 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention are obligated to act to stop or mitigate its consequences 
and punish its perpetrators
36
. The punishment arm epitomised by the ICTR is currently in 
force while the intervention arm of the Convention was never effected even though operation 
Turquoise could be viewed as half-baked too late an endeavour to protect the perpetrator, 
legitimate its political inclinations and ensure that status quo remained. The basis of this 
section is to review the normative basis of intervention, bring in other cases of intervention, 
their legality and moral arguments advanced in their defence as a precursor to understanding 
the failure of the United Nations and individual state responsibility under the Genocide 
Convention. It is through the review of these cases and the particular reality of Rwanda that 
one can establish the causal relationship between non-intervention and the post genocide 
justice regime.   
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 4.3.1. THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT 
The normative doctrine of non-intervention is underpinned by the non-violability of the 
concept of sovereignty defined as “…the political organization based on the exclusion of 
external actors from authority structures within a given territory’ (Krasner 1999: 4).  As a 
social construct that impinges on this exclusion from domestic affairs, it is “… a basic rule of 
coexistence within the international society of states, and states as independent political 
communities asserting sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and 
a particular segment of the human population (Bull 1977: 66). Without this protective cloak 
over a territory the concept of statehood becomes a myth. This mythology is explained by the 
fact that states have generally been accepted as the most important unit in the international 
system. Thus the codification of international principles to protect it was seen quintessential 
for the survival of the international system. While others have challenged the historical 
evolution of the concept which they claim has produced a rigid statist ontology that is ill-
equipped to handle the challenges of global governance… (De Carvalho et al 2011), the 
concept still remains the most evoked premise upon which “political independence and 
territorial integrity” of the state system is impinged. It is as de Carvalho et al argue through 
this “mythology” that western countries have been able to construct statehood. Through the 
application of exclusive internal policies ranging from deprivation to racism, they have used 
nationalism to build the internal cohesion and a collective overarching symbol of national 
unity to prevent internal implosion. In all, external protection and internal cohesion has 
stabilised ‘Western international system’. As de Carvalho et al explains, this 1648 mythology 
as a universal concept, mask the proliferation of international imperial hierarchies, which 
comprised a series of single sovereign colonial powers, each of which stood atop a 
conglomerate of dependent non-sovereign polities. This mythology became an aspect of what 
Krasner alludes to as ‘internal legal sovereignty’ which translated into the mutual recognition 
of states. The UN charter in defining the juridical equality of states makes the premise of its 
sovereignty a non-violable binding legal paradigm. This is codified in article 2(4) of the UN 
charter. Counter restrictionist invoke the same Charter to argue for individual and collective 
right to protect human rights with the claim that article 2(4) only prohibits armed intervention 
against the ‘political independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of states(Damrosch 1991). 
Despite the desire and interest in peace, international politics is still dominated by old rigid 
dogmas defined around state sovereignty. This dogma was informed by old systemic 
understanding of the state as ‘the’ only arbiter in international relations that could represent 
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the interest of peoples, prosecute and be prosecuted. Under such a system, the notion of 
keeping the peace was directly in conflict with this ordering of world politics and thus a clash 
of principles inevitable.  In his agenda for peace 1992, former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan argues about the centrality of the state in the protection of human security but 
challenges the static nature of sovereignty as a protective cloak to state action.
37
The waning 
nature of this concept has been given more thrust by the changes imposed by the constriction 
of time and space, economic interdependence and the perceived ‘universal value of human 
rights. Humanitarian intervention thus defined as the threat or use of force across state 
borders by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave 
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals…with or without the permission of 
the state within whose territory force is being applied (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003), puts a 
dead knell on this ‘mythology’. The problematic with humanitarian intervention is it’s 
premised in protecting a value fashioned as universal but contested as a driving force for a 
liberalisation agenda that projects power and domination through marketization and 
democratisation.  
The protection of human rights rest on the ability of its primary guarantor to function in 
accordance with its role as the principal instrument in the guarantee of human security. On 
the other hand, Humanitarian intervention is a direct attack on the very concept that protects 
the state from external actors and a consequent loss of its primacy as the guarantor of this 
supposed universal value. As Weiss (2007) asserts, humanitarian intervention is associated 
with the use of force to rescue civilians who live in a state that is unable or unwilling to 
protect and succor them’. This explanation seems to suggest that the concept of statehood is 
without a qualificative directive that describes its form. That is why Frost has argued that the 
application of such norms must be “piecemeal” and an asymmetrical process, since without 
internal validation the concept of humanitarian intervention in an anarchical international 
environment void of what Weber calls an “orderer” can face questions of scope and 
legitimacy. (Frost 2009:113) 
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http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html accessed 25.05.11 
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4.3.2 SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS MITIGATING EFFECT 
The discussion about the association of sovereignty with territoriality is giving way to 
functional sovereignty. But this discussion like others is still a regional one. African states are 
still grappling with statehood that is associated with territory. This is understood as a 
consequence of indefensible borders imposed at their conception and that are rarely within 
the control of central authorities. But what is the state? Max Weber once defined the ideal 
state as an organisation “that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory”. Waldron posits that sometimes we use the term to apply to a whole 
community-a territory and everybody in it. Urry (2000) defines the state as a structure that 
“possess the monopoly of jurisdiction or governmentality over members living within the 
territory or region of the society”. The object of territory is central to the notion of statehood. 
Today the concept extends beyond territorial delimitation in which responsibility of actions 
of central authority goes beyond metropolitan territory to jurisdictions over persons. The 
internal organisation of the state is quite important in the nature of the rule of law. 
Autocracies are arbitrary while democracies follow due process. This will be dealt with in 
detail in the due course but suffice to say here that from the first republic of Kayibanda to the 
second of Habyarimana Rwanda has been structured as an autocracy which could in a way 
explain the circle of repeated pogroms and amnesties.  
The constriction of time and space has dented the notion of firm territoriality; commercial 
interest has replaced sovereign interest and respect of human rights has further strained the 
notion of territorial sovereignty and ‘internal affairs’. All of these constraints to the notion of 
statehood had defined Africa’s states emergence from one form of territorial usurpation and 
control to another. Even at independence most African states lacked the legal personality due 
to the lack of full territorial control and the presence of multiple centres with claim to the use 
of legitimate violence. This makes the application of this notion to African states quite shaky 
since the sovereignty of most African states has been an illusionary social construct that 
revolves around artificial borders inherited from their colonial masters and lacks territorial 
control that projects authority to inhospitable territories. The notion of sovereignty Weber 
argues follows the logic of possessing …absolute authority of its territory and people and to 
have independence internationally (Weber 2010:14). And as Herbst concludes, ‘states are 
only viable if they are able to control the territories defined by their borders (Herbst 2000:3). 
It is also a point emphasised by Lemken in his research on “African lessons for International 
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Relations research”38 and emphasised in the definition of states advanced by Urry. The debate 
about statehood in Africa is informed on the one hand by the ideal, developed and functional 
state that guarantees peace and security and the sole authority in the use of force as 
crystalized by the Westphalian notion and on the other hand by the utilisation of prefixes like 
pariah, failed in describing the same concept with respect to the continent. The treaty of 
Westphalia for the first time impugned on the state the notion of sovereignty underpinned by 
territoriality and the principle of non-intervention. It is these two notions that today forms the 
legal foundation of the state and to a certain extend guides relations between states. The 
African states were therefore spared the huge effort of legitimating sovereignty; a notion 
resolved by what Jackson called a “rights model of international relations” (Herbst 2000; 
98)
39
. As I earlier indicated, these two premises are questionable when it comes to the 
defining a of state in Africa, not least because of the historical processes that shaped borders 
between African states, but more so because the notion of true independence that underpins 
the principle of non-intervention remains very fluid. Although according to status quo 
adherents this notion still defines international relations to a large extend, revisionist 
challenge the dominant role of statism due to other emerging legal entities at the international 
level. It is these revisionists believe that further complicates the notion and role of the nation 
state in Africa with respect to the Westphalia principles. And if Lemke’s research outcome 
that “dyads with a territorial disagreement are eleven times more likely to experience war 
than are dyads without a territorial disagreement…” is anything to go by, then the value, 
norm and belief symmetry that informed post-colonial African leadership minimised 
territorial dispute and consequently reduced the possibilities of wars. Or was it simply 
because these ‘states’ were not states in the classical Westphalia sense with the control of 
territory and military? In reviewing the notion of internal organisation in determining the way 
states function or the role statesmen play in defining its interest, it will be easy to conclude on 
the inevitability of conflict in the continent. But how do these notions of territorial control, 
internal organisation and attitude of statesmen inform our understanding of the conflict in 
Rwanda? Rwanda like most African states did not have full control of its territory at the time 
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of the genocide and thus the concepts of “national consolidation and self-preservation” 
(Rosecrance 1979;17) and the monopoly of violence very questionable. This lack of 
territorial control exacerbate internal strives. These conflicts in values and economic 
discrepancies are exploited by dominant groups which translate in material structures of 
power for dominance. The combination of lack of territorial control and autocratic form of 
rule were important in determining the notion of peace and war in Rwanda. Conversely it was 
the latter; that is the attitude of the statesman that held Rwanda together and kept the level of 
conflict abbey. Morgenthau opined about the statesman that: “they speak for it, negotiate 
treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means of achieving them, and try to 
maintain, increase, and demonstrate power” ( Morgenthau 1985;118). He further argues that 
the protection of sovereignty goes beyond the protection of territory. It is deeply embedded in 
the protection of a culture, a political system that ensures the preservation of that culture and 
the territorial integrity that localises that culture within a geographic location. Without such a 
control and protection of territory a nation’s culture would be at the mercy of more 
sophisticated and enduring cultures and thus renders the loss of that culture inevitable. 
Intervention is thus seen to be antithetical to this principle. It is a notion that has been given a 
“qualitatively new and different thrust” (Ayoob 2002;83). Ayoob goes on to define this thrust 
in two fold. The first involves defining intervention in terms of “objectives or goals” 
encapsulated as humanitarian. This thrust narrows the scope of intervention to a very specific 
goal directed at arresting an on-going catastrophe. The second projection of intervention 
Ayoob argues has been in terms of the “international community”. This multilateral 
underpinning of intervention takes away the ‘soft goals’ restrictionists have consistently used 
in arguing against intervention. In debunking the sovereignty cloak to humanitarian 
intervention Liberalist like Teson makes sovereignty a contingent concept. And as Smith 
argues, “the justification for state sovereignty cannot rest on its own presumptive legitimacy” 
(Rosenthal & Barry 2009:79), consequently he asserts that “a state that oppresses its own 
people violates the integrity and autonomy of its subjects and consequently forfeits its moral 
claim to full sovereignty”. And if the moral claim of a society rest on its ability to protect and 
respect the rights of its members and their consent, explicit or implicit, to its rules and 
institutions, (Ibid;78) could Rwanda have invoked any moral claim over its territory? Walzer 
would answer this with a no and argues that “the moral standing of any particular state, 
depends upon, the reality of the common rights it protects…and if the state does not defend 
the common life that does exist, its own defence may have no moral justification”(Walzer 
79;54). State centric arguments which are consistent with the principle of non-intervention on 
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the other hand reject any claim of moral judgement about war, preferring to situate war 
within the context of what Walzer describes as ‘self –interest and necessity’(Ibid;3). The 
“survival and freedom of political communities…” Walzer argues “…whose members share 
a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children…”(Ibid;254). 
While Walzer accepts the notion of intervention, he doesn’t do it without great reservation 
when he argues about setting “radical limits to the notion of necessity”. In vilifying Spanish 
intervention in the Americas, Francisco de Vitora decried the extent to which intervention in 
the internal affairs can go. While acknowledging certain moral obligations in intervening for 
victims even if not invited, he warned against “translating intervention into lawful conquest” 
(Nardi 1988). The state-centric premise of realist assumptions transforms the state into a 
moral space with a communitarian agenda. This is however not incompatible with Liberalist 
claim for the duty of states to protect and respect human rights. The right to self-preservation 
is consistent with realist strong desire with the protection of territorial integrity, culture and 
political institutions, and thus at odds with a notion of forcible military intervention. And if 
“War is still somehow a rule governed activity, a world of permissions and prohibitions, a 
moral world, therefore in the midst of hell… though there is no license for war makers, there 
is a license for soldiers and they hold it without regard to which side they belong…” (Walzer 
77;38) at what stage is intervention grounded in moral and legal claims? The debate as we 
know is non-consensual.  
4.3.3 HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE OF INTERVENTION 
4.3.3.1 THE CASE OF BANGLADESH 
In 1971, India intervened in the civil war in Pakistan on the premise of self-defence even 
though it could still have invoked a moral rational based on the systematic nature of human 
rights violation by the Pakistani authorities; a claim seen as genocidal in nature.40The 
intervention of India was incremental beginning with indirect assistance and a full land 
invasion after a Pakistani air raid on its basis. The moral basis for India’s intervention can be 
argued on two grounds. The evidence of massive human rights violation which was 
systematic in nature can hardly be contested. India also faced an unprecedented influx of 
refugees which of course translated into a humanitarian crisis that could threaten international 
peace and security. This alone Teson and others argue makes the violation of Pakistani 
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http://nsm1.nsm.iup.edu/sanwar/Bangladesh%20Genocide.htm also see Leo Kuper 1981 
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sovereignty a moral one. On the other end of the morality conundrum, there is no doubt that 
‘hard goals’ informed India’s intervention. On the legality of the intervention, it is clear that 
there was no explicit UN Security Council mandate sanctioning India’s intervention. India 
however invoked the right to ‘self-defence’ to situate its right to intervene. It is a similar 
dilemma the US faced 32 years later with the invasion of Iraq.  
4.3.3.2 THE CASE OF IRAQ 
On the 2
nd
 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared it an integral part of its territory. 
On the 29 November the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 678
41
 
authorising the use of force to end the occupation of Kuwait. In 1991 Iraqi forces were 
defeated and a cease fire sanctioned under UN resolution 687. Twelve years later and 
specifically in March of 2003, the United States of America led another coalition of states 
that invaded Iraq without an explicit UNSC resolution to do so. Opponents of the invasion 
have argued that the absence of a UN authorisation and any reasonable claim of self-defence 
made the US invasion illegal and a war of aggression. Another school of thought espoused by 
those who claim legality of the 2003 invasion argue that two independent sources of law gave 
the United States and its allies a legal cover for the invasion. The right to anticipatory self-
defence and UNSC resolution 678(1990)
42
 which authorised member states to “use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660(1990)
43
 and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area”44. In UNSC resolution 
1441,
45
 the Security Council found Iraq to be in breach of its earlier resolutions and that its 
continuous development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, its support for 
international terrorism and its repression of the civilian population presented an on-going 
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 1441 was a UNSC resolution adopted unanimously on November 8, 2002 which called on 
Iraq to respect its disarmament obligations and found Iraq to be in material breach of the 
cease fire terms especially with respect to the ‘proliferation of WMD and long range missiles’ 
Council on Foreign relations site: http://www.cfr.org/un/un-security-council-resolution-1441-
iraq/p11207 
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threat to international peace and security. On the other hand the United States as a party to 
resolution 687(1991) invoked the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to argue of the 
legality of the 2003 invasion. The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties allows a party to 
a treaty affected by its “material breach…” to “invoke the breach as a ground to terminating 
the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part”.46 On the moral aspect of the 
intervention, the US failed to show any moral claim beyond its national security interest; as 
advanced by the Bush administration. The later claims of human rights have been discredited 
as US’s attempt at hoodwinking the world to grant it international legitimacy over its actions 
after having failed to find weapons of mass destruction.  
Other cases of unilateral interventions without UN mandate but with far reaching moral 
claims are the 1978 Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia which was impinged on the 
genocidal actions of the Khmer Rouge and the 1979 Tanzanian invasion of Uganda. Like the 
case of India, Tanzania advanced self-defence after Uganda annexed part of its territory and 
self-determination by Ugandan exiles to replace a brutal dictatorship. Even though the moral 
claim for intervention was overwhelming, they were hardly advanced as justification for 
Tanzanian action. Another humanitarian intervention that underscores the evolving normative 
framework void of legal validity was the NATO 1999 intervention in Kosovo. In 1989 after 
late president Milosevic revoked the autonomy that Kosovo had enjoyed since the time of 
President Tito, the corresponding direct rule inflamed ethnic Albanian nationalism which 
resulted in the declaration of independence in 1990. For almost a decade there was 
heightened tension between Kosovo and Belgrade as the separatist strived to erect separate 
institutions of self-rule. This escalated in 1998 with fighting between Serb forces and 
separatist elements of the UCK otherwise known as KLA. In the same year the UN Security 
Council passed resolution 1199 (1998)
47
 under its Chapter VII mandate in which it was 
“deeply alarmed…with the grave humanitarian situation…” which it considers a threat to 
international peace and security. As the security situation deteriorated with reports of 
massacres the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) issued an activation order on 13 
October 1998 for airstrikes against Serb forces. Like the 2003 Iraq invasion there was no 
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explicit Security Council authorisation of the action and like the same 2003 invasion the 
reliance on resolution 1199 was rooted in the inability of the lead members of the alliance to 
secure an explicit Council authorisation after Russia threatened a veto. Yet the moral grounds 
for NATO’s action though uncontested in terms of the humanitarian and human rights 
situation and the history of the bestiality of conflict in the region, there is no doubt that ‘hard 
goals’ rooted in the desire to weaken the last base of Russian influence greatly influenced 
NATO’s action. It is clear that post 1945 humanitarian interventions have been greatly 
shaped by issues of national security, territorial integrity and rationalised on Charter 
principles of self-defence.  
On the other hand post-cold war interventions have been greatly influenced by the increasing 
argument of cosmopolitanism and the universal validity of human rights norms across time 
and space. Despite the abysmal failure in Somalia in 1992 in what has become popularised as 
‘Black Hawk Down’, the incentive to intervene on human rights grounds remained strong. 
This was not however the case in Rwanda as ‘crossing the Mogadishu line’ was deemed 
irrevocably counterproductive and political suicide.  
4.3.4 COULD INTERVENTION HAVE STOPPED THE GENOCIDE? 
Kupperman (2001) argues that humanitarian intervention wouldn’t have stopped the Rwanda 
genocide. The genocide he argues “happened much faster, the West learnt from it much later 
and the requisite intervention would have been much slower…” He however believes that 
political will could have engineered an intervention that could have mitigated the effect of the 
genocide. In Rwanda even if intervention could have saved only one quarter of the ultimate 
Tutsi victims, that still means approximately 125,000 innocent lives could have been spared. ’ 
It is a sentiment echoed by Barnett (2002). As a UN insider who read cables from Rwanda on 
what he described as “the gruesome nature of the violence, murder campaign that seems to 
have no limit, and reported bodies lining the streets and mutilated corpses piled high in 
churches and schools”, like Kupperman he still expresses his doubt that intervention could 
have halted the genocide. It is a similar sentiment expressed in a 1999 Human Rights Watch 
report, “leave no one to tell the story”.48 Barnett’s argument of a bureaucratic culture that 
transforms individuals as independent thinkers with a well-developed and conscientious 
thought pattern into agents of Weberian bureaucratic rationality seems to negate the interest 
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prone and rational foreign policy doctrine that sometimes shapes international relations. This 
sentiment of ‘bureaucratic inertia’ is expressed by Dallaire after a September 6, 1993 meeting 
with Kofi Annan when he served as head of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations 
(DPKO) (Dallaire 2003:80). It was some have argued not the bureaucratic inertia that 
prevented action but geo-political interest and the legal and moral implications attached with 
identifying the killings in Rwanda as genocidal in nature.
49
 As Barnett(2002), elucidate, that 
“various high ranking officials were not as ignorant as they let on…that the constraints were 
self-imposed and how those who assumed roles that gave them authority over Rwanda 
allowed alternative commitments to trump their obligations…” It was these alternative 
commitments that defy the logic of the universal application of ideal norms. It is this ‘many 
morality’, Barnett argues that lies at the heart of UN intervention doctrine.  Rwanda 
epitomises the tension between morality and empiricism. On the moral end of the tension, 
Barnett’s ‘many morality’ highlights why empirical evidence of murder that should have 
initiated intervention were doctored, poorly communicated or quietly hidden in UN parlance 
of ‘we are seized with the situation’. This was highlighted by the conflict between Jacques-
Roger Booh Booh and General Dallaire not only in actions on the ground (Dallaire 
2003;213),
50
 but also in terms of the content and interpretation of the situation on the 
ground.
51
 On the empirical side, it is a truism that the genocide never occurred in a vacuum. 
At the time of the genocide, there was a Peace agreement in force that was overseen by a UN 
contingent whose head had a vast understanding of the situation that was unfolding and 
repeatedly cabled the UN on the systematic nature of the killings around Kigali, including 
information on intelligence about arms caches, their distribution to civilians and the UN 
refusal to authorise confiscation. (Melvern 2009;108-109).
52
On the other hand massacres in 
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 Also see Human Rights Watch; Leave no one to tell the story ‘When Dallaire sent his 
January 11 telegram, he understood his mandate to permit seizing illegal arms: he stated that 
he was undertaking the operation rather than requested authorisation for it. But his initiative 
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1992 at Bugesera which were systematic in nature (Ibid;63) would have serve as an early 
warning system to the UN. A 1993 report of an international investigation commission on the 
violation of human rights between 1990/1993 documented systematic killings which 
amounted to targeted massacres of Tutsis,
53
 and made far reaching recommendations to the 
international community.
54
These attacks and massacres were not unrelated to the ensuing 
conflict between the predominantly Tutsi exile group of RPF and the predominantly Hutu 
forces in government.  The racist ideology that had characterised these massacres was enough 
evidence to paint a picture of the nature of any finale in the ever evolving Hutu/Tutsi 
imbroglio.  Apart from the consistent cables, history presented itself to us then and now as a 
reliable data base from which the international community could have drawn experiences 
from to enable far reaching decisions about the consequences of inaction. This history lies in 
the nature of the crime of genocide. Kupperman’s assertion that the speed of the genocide did 
not lend itself to any humanitarian rescue seems to suggest that genocide occurs in a vacuum; 
in a situation of tranquillity. This argument is obviously at odds with the early warnings that 
existed prior to the genocide. Quoting a citation from the ICTR
55
 which states clearly when 
the ‘other’ was defined and identified, Melvern makes the argument that the commission 
created by Habyarimana to identify the enemy and to identify what had to be done to defeat it 
militarily, in the media and politically(Melvern 2000;61). A report commissioned by the then 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) concluded that the genocide in Rwanda was the easiest 
to stop. It reached this conclusion amongst others by using the same argument of the presence 
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 The Commission made Four principal recommendations to the international community 
which included 1) To condition Aid to the respect of human rights, 2) To put an end to all 
military aid to the belligerents, 3) To continue to raise the situation of human rights in front 
of the competent international institutions, 4) To continue to encourage the parties to adhere 
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of early warning signs.
56
In a similar vein Adelman (2005) though conscious of contrary 
positions like those expressed by Kupperman, concluded that such early warning signs as 
they existed in Rwanda could serve as part of a warning system about the initial stages in a 
trend towards extra-ordinary evil (Adelman 2005:11). Akkhavan (1997) supplements this 
argument first by dismissing the “tribal war thesis” that greets African conflicts and added 
that the efficiency and scale of the killings especially in an African country depicted an 
impressive feat of organisation and thus cannot simply be dismissed as an unforseable 
outburst of primordial bloodlust.
57
Genocide is not an act defined by spontaneity void of 
conception, definition of the other, dehumanisation of the other, planning and execution.
58
 
Let me presume against the literature that there was no smoking gun that could have 
warranted intervention even a belated one to challenge Kuppermans assertion; France’s 
arming and diplomatic defence of the genocidaires, Belgium’s withdrawal of its troops in the 
wake of the genocide and president Clintons’ demand of the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers 
seems against all conventional wisdom to have hasten the killings (Mills and Brunner 2002; 
250).  
Rwanda seems to have been by design or fate fallen out of the moral imperative that defines 
intervention. Rwanda lends itself as a geopolitical standoff in which France’s support 
politically and militarily of the Habyarimana regime gave the West a raison d’être to invoke 
the ‘crossing the Mogadishu line’ argument to allow mass murder run its course. From the 
literature of cases reviewed above, it is clear that intervention could have stopped the 
genocide or atleast reduce it into some massacres. This scenario inadvertently would have 
shaped the post conflict frame into one of compromise. The consequence of inaction was the 
genocide, an outright victory by the RPF and its insistence on determining the post genocide 
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justice system that has been innovative in its design, ambitious in its goal and in equal 
measure ambiguous in its operationalization. 
In this section, the study has reviewed the moral and legal premise of humanitarian 
intervention while injecting some case studies to substantiate the various arguments. The 
main purpose of this general thrust has been to locate where the various arguments about 
non-intervention in Rwanda lies as to situate its effect on its post genocide justice framework 
and its impact on reconciliation.  The question that now arises is what would have happened 
should there have been an intervention in Rwanda. This would form the basis of the 
counterfactual argument in the preceding section.  
4.3.5 INTERVENTION AND RECONCILIATION: THE COUNTERFACTUAL 
ARGUMENT 
Humanitarian intervention as defined in section 4.3.1 has been sold as an action of last resort 
by a country or group of countries intervening in the internal affairs of another country 
because of the unwillingness or inability of that country to protect its own people. The new 
thrust of intervention defined under the new regime of the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
revolves around the same argument but premised on the notions of prevention, the protection 
of civilian population (PoC) and reconstruction.  
In its 2001 report on state sovereignty and protection, the ICISS stressed the reactive arm of 
R2P as a “responsibility to react to compelling needs of human protection”.59 The 
Commission emphasised coercive intervention as a consequence of the failure of “preventive 
measures” and only when the “state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation” of massive 
human rights abuses.
60
 Rwanda thus fulfilled the “just cause” premise advanced by the 
Commission in that there was “large scale loss of life and large scale ethnic cleansing”. The 
Commission also argues that in the contemplation of intervention, the need for “post 
intervention strategy is also of paramount importance…as true reconciliation is best 
generated by ground level reconstruction effort. 
In a 1998 report on the Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable 
development in Africa, then UNSG Kofi Annan argued that  
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“The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human 
development”.61 
 
The SG reports continues to argue that 
 
“to avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, emphasis must 
be placed on critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect 
for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the 
safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons;” 
Consequently it must be argued that for intervention that leads to reconciliation to be 
successful or at least manageable a holistic approach which emphasises both protection and 
reconstruction must be considered. Rwanda presents itself as a classic example where 
prevention failed and in which even in the absence of hindsight the legitimacy and legality of 
intervention could have bestowed international legitimacy to any post intervention 
reconstruction efforts. Intervention as argued before could have protected the civilian 
population and fulfilled a very important aspect of the human security development nexus 
link. The other consequence of non-intervention was that the war ended by the collapse of the 
former regime and consequently allowed the victorious party to define the conflict frame and 
imposed a post genocide justice system that the vanquished has long described as a victors 
justice system. This consequently challenges the legitimacy of the process and frustrates 
efforts at using accountability as a source of reconciliation. 
A genealogy of past interventions has produced a very mix result on their effect on 
reconciliation. Although these interventions have been different in their complexity, scope 
and source of authority, no consistent pattern that can be generalised has so far emerged. A 
synopsis of a few of these interventions analysed in a comparative manner would paint a 
clearer picture of what could have happened in Rwanda should the international community 
have decided to intervene. 
In 1993 the United States led a coalition of states that overthrew the government of Iraq and 
arrested Saddam Hussein and other top members of the Baath party. The complexity, scope 
and legality of this invasion have been dealt with in section 4.3.3.2. The mode of termination 
of the conflict was similar to that of Rwanda. Rwanda is depicted as a conflict that terminated 
by collapse. On the other hand it is also a reality that most of Rwanda’s military officers 
actually retreated with the thousands of refugees that moved into the DRC. Some civilian 
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officials like Theoneste Bagosora were actually airlifted by France to safety.
62
  In Iraq the 
conflict terminated by retreat. Unlike in Rwanda where most of the military and civilian 
officials moved into the DRC, in Iraq the military and civilian officials simply vanished into 
internal strongholds where they organised resistance against the occupation. Iraq’s “post 
conflict” justice was initiated with the hope that retributive justice would unite the three main 
groups and sap out the energy and motivation from the insurgency and allow the political 
process to reconcile the different stakeholders in the conflict. Intervention as argued above is 
actually centred on the necessity to protect the civilian population and to ensure that post 
conflict does not engineer reverse ethnic cleansing. Intervention in Iraq failed to either protect 
the civilian population or fostered reconciliation. The complexity of the Iraq situation mirrors 
to a certain extent that of Rwanda with its internal dynamics of group tension and external 
influence ethnic loyalties and geopolitical, strategic and economic interest. 
The situation of Sierra Leone injects an interesting distinction to that of Iraq. In 1995 and 
1997, Executive Outcome mercenaries (EO) and forces of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) countries subsequently intervened in the bloody civil war that had 
pitted forces of the government of Sierra Leone and rebels of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF). In the year 2000, the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone invited the 
British government to intervene in the conflict to save a fledgling Lome Agreement that was 
being threatened by a resurgent RUF. The source of authority of the British mandate was 
resolution 1270 under a UNSC Chapter VII mandate.
63
  
The intervention was a sweeping success as the British forces were able to defeat the RUF 
and secure the environment for military victory to be translated into political success. The 
success of intervention and a reconstruction process that enjoyed international legitimacy 
injected the critical ingredient needed for post conflict reconciliation to take root. 
Similar to Sierra Leone, Rwanda was both a case for state and nation building. Both countries 
had suffered long years of dictatorship and protracted conflict that had rendered the 
institutions of state totally ineffective. Like in Sierra Leone, in Rwanda allegiance to different 
ethnic groups superseded that to any overarching national identity. The post conflict justice 
mechanisms in Sierra Leone were product of a peace accord. Despite the institutionalisation 
of a hybrid system that married both a retributive and restorative form of justice dispensations 
                                                          
62
 Alison Desforges(1999). Leave no one to tell the story: Human Rights Watch 
63
 S/RES/1270 (1999) para 14 
 55  
the conditions that existed in Sierra Leone were absent in Rwanda. While in Sierra Leone the 
post conflict justice mechanism was an element inscribed in the Lome peace accord, in 
Rwanda the domestic post genocide justice mechanism was simply a contingency institution 
solely decided and instituted by the RPF led government to mitigate the massive arrests and 
detentions. Consequently success in Sierra Leone could be attributed partially to a successful 
intervention both as reactionary and reconstruction tools, a post conflict justice system 
limited in scope and an inclusive political process. In Rwanda if intervention had produced 
the same result as in Sierra Leone it could have still terminated the conflict by collapse but 
that would not have been defined as an RPF victory. Consequently the conflict frame would 
have been defined differently and the initial insistence on a backward looking approach of 
post genocide justice designed to end the culture of impunity could at least have been altered. 
The difference however between Sierra Leone and Rwanda is that while in Sierra Leone the 
state was not the primary perpetrator of impunity, in Rwanda the state was the agent that 
violated both its positive and negative obligations towards its citizens. And worst still in 
Rwanda the church as an institution that had been so pivotal for restorative justice whether in 
Sierra Leone or South Africa was part and parcel of the genocidal machinery. Consequently it 
wouldn’t be untrue to argue that intervention could have had the legal and moral cover to 
influence in a significant way the post conflict reconstruction design and grant the necessary 
legitimacy any post conflict reconciliation effort requires to be successful. 
 
4.4. POST GENOCIDE JUSTICE: 
The argument that the genocide in Rwanda was fatalistic is not unusual position about plural 
societies in Africa. This argument trickled down in the early days of post genocide Rwanda to 
shape attitudes about its post conflict reconstruction package. On the contrary the thrust of 
the three preceding thematic have all been somehow deterministic in rebutting at least to a 
certain extent the fatalistic presuppositions about the genocide. After having been able to 
establish some level of causality between the thematic considered and the post genocide 
justice architecture, the proceeding section would focus on the justice mechanism itself, its 
operations, and the form of justice it delivers and the effect of this justice from a general and 
Hutu perspective on reconciliation. 
The United Nations perceives Transitional or post conflict justice as a tool of post conflict 
peace building. The question of justice in post conflict societies has been approached in 
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different ways. It may encompass either a restorative or retributive arm or both as in Rwanda 
depending on the objective set by the post conflict society. Kerr and Mobekk (2007) define 
post conflict justice as “the range of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms aimed at dealing 
with a legacy of large scale abuses of human rights and/or violations of international 
humanitarian law”. As Clark argues, at the heart of transitional justice are questions of what 
reconstructive objectives post-conflict societies should pursue and how they should pursue 
them’ (Clark and Kaufman (eds)2008;191). There is no static system valid across time and 
space. Each transitional society chooses a system commensurate with its objective and suited 
to its socio-cultural and political system. This as Clark argues, also depends on the objective 
such a transitional society has set as its main goals. Two extremes and opposite goals Malan 
argues seem to be morally defective and should be ruled out; revenge and forgetting and 
moving on (David(ed) 2008;144). Irrespective of the form of transitional justice chosen by 
any society, there is an inherent tension between the objective set forth and the means 
designed to achieve those objectives. The tensions between the ideal and the practical means 
of achieving particular objectives are not unique to transitional justice (Clark and Kaufman 
(eds)2008;382). While the ideal in most post conflict societies is achieving peace and order 
through reconciliation which are necessary prerequisites for post conflict reconstruction. On 
the practical end of the conundrum lies the reality these societies face after a devastating 
conflict that has not only wrecked institutions of post conflict peace building but has 
constructed a wedge between the different components of the society. Overcoming these 
tensions and facing the reality of such situation is what most post conflict societies grapple 
with. This section reviews Rwanda’s post genocide justice mechanism within the context of 
its local reality and international demands of fairness with a particular focus on the Gacaca.  
The literature is rich with ideas about the prerequisites, structural conditions that determine a 
particular choice of post conflict justice system.
64
 South Africa instituted the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which had as its main objective the exposition of the truth 
in exchange to the granting of amnesty. This method of post conflict justice was tailored 
towards achieving reconciliation between peoples who were bound to inhabit the same 
country. This objective was influenced by the intra-state nature of the conflict and 
rationalised by fear of the possibility of civil war should retributive form of justice be 
pursued. It could also be argued that South Africa unique mix amplified this fear since 
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economic power was wholly vested in the hands of the white minority and any form of 
retributive justice could have backfired in terms of capital flight and its consequences on 
post-apartheid reconstruction would have been enormous.
65
 Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) 
argue that the relationship between order and justice is characterised by tensions, with justice 
seen to be realisable only within the context of order.
66
 Zaum on the other hand reverses the 
trend arguing that Western states perceive justice as a necessary prerequisite for order, peace 
and stability(Clark and Kaufman(eds)2008;364). Kaufman et al further argue that some of 
these tensions may be avoidable often by prioritising one objective over the other or simply 
adopting a holistic approach to post conflict justice. Other tensions they argue are inevitable 
because of the inherent complexity of the conflicts. After the genocide, the Rwandan 
government and the international community embraced retributive justice as a post genocide 
mechanism designed to punish the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and to end what both 
parties considered as the culture of impunity that had characterised Rwandan history,
67
 and 
replace such a culture with that of accountability. The urge for judicial accountability was in 
sharp contrast with the perceived notion of African redress mechanism and especially coming 
at the heels of the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) designed to achieve post-
apartheid reconciliation in South Africa. At the international level, the UN Security Council 
passed resolution 955 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as 
an ad hoc design to use judicial procedure to achieve reconciliation.
68
 As Hassan argues, the 
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normative basis for the UNSC involvement in establishing the ICTR was Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and the four pillars of the global legal order(Clark and Kaufman(eds)2008;262). 
What Hassan calls the four pillars of the international legal order encompasses international 
humanitarian and human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law. But reading 
the text of resolution 955, it is unmistaken that the ICTR is designed to prosecute crimes 
perceived as occurring strictly in times of conflict and within the period of 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994. This explains some of the sharp reservations of the Rwandan 
government addressed elsewhere in this study. In a 2004 report by the former Secretary 
General of the UN to the Security Council (SC) Kofi Annan stressed the need for transitional 
justice to be context driven but one that “ensures a common basis of international norms and 
standards.” The report warns against the “one size-fits all formulas and the importation of 
foreign models’.69On the question of the tensions raised by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003, 
Kaufman et al (2008) and Zaum, the report argues that “justice peace and democracy are not 
mutually exclusive objectives but rather mutually re-enforcing imperatives”. Thus the 
argument of Kaufman et al that such tensions could be mitigated by prioritising one objective 
over the other stands in sharp contrast with the mutually re-enforcing imperative’ doctrine of 
the UN and the reality of post genocide in Rwanda.  
4.4.1. THE ICTR VERSUS LOCAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 
Rwanda initially opposed the resolution setting up the ICTR on several grounds amongst 
which included the ad hoc nature of the tribunal which limited its mandate to prosecuting 
only crimes that occurred in 1994. The second rational was underpinned by the lack of an 
independent prosecutor and an appeals chamber; the imprisonment of those found guilty 
outside of Rwanda which abstracts them from the pressure of the moral space of the victims; 
the non-exclusion of certain countries ‘complicit’ in the genocide from nominating judges 
and any firm commitment to locating the seat of the tribunal in Rwanda.  These are points 
current Rwandan president argues takes away the process of justice from the reach of victims. 
It is one amplified by Kaufmann et al when they argue that ‘investigation, prosecution and 
punishment of alleged perpetrators may not promote genuine reconciliation among 
antagonists, especially if the imprisonment of convicted perpetrators separates them 
physically from victims of violence and the rest of the population, thus minimising the 
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capacity of offenders and victims to engage, and reconcile with each other (Clark and 
Kaufman (eds)2008;387).
70
 
The rational of resolution 955 which created the ICTR rested on two pillars. The first which 
has been drummed up by most institutions dealing with post genocide Rwanda rest on the 
need to promote what the statutes of the tribunal affirms would contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace. The other pillar of the 
tribunal rests on the need to punish perpetrators and to ensure that the violations of 
international humanitarian law upon whose mandate the tribunal rest are halted and 
effectively addressed. Akhahan (1997) emphasises the effect of this undertaking on 
reconciliation by pointing out the symbolic effect on national reconciliation and deterrence of 
prosecuting even a small number of the leaders before such an impartial international 
jurisdiction. In a 2006 paper on polarisation and Conflict project, Tove et al argue that from 
the point of “psychology retributive justice can enable victims to attain closure and restore 
healthy relations toward one another”.71 They nonetheless emphasize the nature of the post 
conflict regime as an important element in delegitimizing the prestige and discrediting the 
ideology of the old order while also emphasizing the cardinality of the outcome of the 
conflict in determining the form of the justice mechanism.
72
 In recognising the role the 
national jurisdiction of justice dispensation has on reconciliation, article 8 of the statute of the 
tribunal emphasises its concurrent role with national jurisdiction even though in a situation of 
conflict the ICTR according to article 8 will have primacy over national courts. The Rwandan 
authorities feel that the current system of justice at the level of the ICTR established under 
UNGAOR 955 fails to provide effective justice. And at a very huge financial cost, 
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bureaucratic inefficiency, insuperable and managerial difficulties between the Chambers, 
prosecutor’s office and the registry has portrayed the ICTR as an inefficient system of justice 
dispenser.
73
 It is a point stressed by President Kagame
74
 and supported by a 2007 workshop 
report commissioned by the International Center for transitional justice.
75
 Tutsis feel not only 
betrayed by such a justice system but also by the fact that some countries which pushed for 
such a system considered divorced or abstracted from the reality of the victims still shelter 
some of the planners and perpetrators of the genocide. These countries and institutions are 
perceived as having failed the Rwandan people in their direst moment of need. Despite the 
tension between international justice and domestic justice being pursued in Rwanda and the 
reservations expressed by Rwanda, there has been some rapprochement in addressing the 
concerns of Rwanda. In June 2011, the first case under the tribunals’ jurisdiction was referred 
to the jurisdiction of Rwanda.
76
 Generally for any such referral to take place, the tribunal 
certified that the victim would receive a fair trial and if found guilty will not face the death 
penalty. Despite certification that the national jurisdiction must proceed with trials consistent 
with international standards and norms of fairness without which such referral will be 
revoked, this marked a significant development in cooperation with a sceptical Rwanda. 
Apart from the referral, the arrest, trial and conviction  of high profile suspects like Ernesto 
Bogesora,
77
 Akayesu and others and the first high profile judgement in the Akayesu case did 
not only increase the reputation of the tribunal but also redefined in a more specific manner 
certain ambivalent concepts in the debate on genocide.
78
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On the contrary, the recommendations of a 1995 Kigali conference “stressed the vital need of 
bringing the perpetrators of genocide to justice”. In stressing the need for punishment as 
opposed to the South African system under the TRC, the conference pushed for “…an 
uncompromising step to take in order to combat the tragic history of impunity that led to 
repeated genocide in the country and rejected the possibility of a blanket amnesty”. The 
culture of impunity is cited by the UN special Rapporteur for human rights as one of the 
principal causes of genocide. Apart from the rejection of alternate political power and the 
effect of incitement, this culture of impunity spans almost half a century and its devastating 
effectiveness could only be seen as a perfection of a tool of politics that had been perfected 
overtime. On the need to achieving reconciliation and political order, the conference stressed 
the need to balance the “imperative need for justice and the stability of the society”79. 
Underscoring the need for punishment rather than amnesty, Shabas writes that the Rwandan 
president at the time called for an innovative form of justice while ruling out any form of 
amnesty (Clark & Kaufman 2008;213). The desire by Rwandan authorities to deal with this 
crime from a broader spectrum translated the recommendations of the Kigali conference into 
legislation and structures as a domestic approach to dealing with the impunity of the 
country’s past.80 The study shall then focus on properly analysing this alternative domestic 
approach and how such a locally owned approach deals with the notion abstraction and 
collective conscience. 
4.4.2. CODIFYING A DOMESTIC APPROACH TO JUSTICE: 
Recognising the different levels of involvement in the genocide the Rwandan authorities 
passed legislation that dealt separately with planners, instigators and the hundreds of 
thousands of foot soldiers who by commission or omission took part in the genocide. Chapter 
II of the legislation categorised different levels of offenders to be treated through different 
judicial and non-judicial procedures. Category I offenders are seen as the principal planners, 
instigators, supervisors, leaders of the crime of genocide, murderers
81
. Category II offenders 
are seen of a slightly lower tier and categorised as the main foot soldiers in the genocide 
especially as conspirators and perpetrators. Lower down the classification ladder is category 
III offenders who are judged as having committed “other serious assault against persons”. 
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The lowest tiers of offenders are listed in category IV as arsonist and those who took part in 
the destruction of property. The central tenet of the organic law was embedded in the 
restorative aspect of the quasi-judicial organ of what Kerr and Morbekk (2007) alludes to as 
the non- judicial aspect of post conflict justice. The confession and guilty plea procedure 
accepts the participation of everyone in the confession
82
 procedure but the bargain end of the 
scheme cannot hold for persons listed as category I offenders. It should also be noted that 
confessions and guilty plea does not exempt categories I-IV offenders from prosecution. 
What it does according to arts 15 and 16 of the organic law is reducing and commuting the 
sentences of the offenders. The problematic with this procedure is its lack of incentive and its 
threat arm to dismiss confessions deemed not genuine enough to warrant acceptance and 
recourse to the normal judiciary process based on the penal code. In one aspect, it encourages 
false confessions from persons who might likely be category I offenders and in the other 
forces even innocent persons fearing being pushed through the conventional judiciary 
process. The domestic approach to post genocide justice as defined by the organic law is 
retributive to say the least and seems to follow the logic that accountability through 
punishment remains the best option at achieving reconciliation. Categorisation of offenders 
seems not to have solve the fundamental problem of what Mambani(2002) described as a 
genocide of too many offenders and too few beneficiaries. The third mechanism dealing with 
the genocide is a customary system of dispute resolution known as the gacaca. 
4.4.3 THE GACACA 
Rwanda premised post genocide justice in punishing those responsible for the crime of 
genocide. This has been rationalised based on the desire to end the culture of impunity that 
has characterised Rwandan history since independence. Although such a stance was initially 
viewed as consistent with international model of dispensing justice, it was seen by others as 
antithetical to an African tradition epitomised by ‘forgiveness and reconciliation’. Faced with 
a reality that defies logic, the Rwandan government renege on the solely retributive arm of 
justice. This reality was reflected by the sheer number of persons who had actually taken part 
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in the genocide. It is a tension described by Kaufmann et al as one between ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’. This tension translates into a conflict between ‘idealism’ and ‘capability’ 
(William & Clark 2008;382). The duality of these tensions sits at the heart of the Rwandan 
post genocide justice. At one end of the tension is the need for reconciliation through justice 
and on the other end is the need for order through justice. The second tension is that between 
what Kaufmann et al termed idealism versus capability. It is clear from the Rwandan 
situation that the desire to use prosecution as a way of ending what many called the culture of 
impunity didn’t quite marry with the capability of a bottom up genocide that destroyed the 
institutions of justice. This is where an old form of family institution of justice was invoked 
and rebranded to deal with a contingency situation characterised by massive incarceration. 
Gachacha or simply written Gacaca has been a traditional model of dispute settlement that 
focused on restoration rather than retribution especially in non-criminal domestic feuds. 
Faced with the reality of bottom up and top bottom participation, the Rwandan authorities 
enacted Law No.40/200 of 26 January 2001 creating the Gacaca tribunals charged with the 
prosecution of persons who fall within category 2, 3 and 4 as defined by article 51 of Organic 
Law No. 40/200. The organisation of the Gacaca courts followed the administrative setup of 
Rwanda which constituted 12 divisions, 145 municipalities, 1531 sections and 8981 cells. 
According to article 4 of the Gacaca legislation, the jurisdiction of the various Gacaca courts 
shall be the divisions, municipalities, sections and cells. Each Gacaca tribunal according to 
article 5 of the organic law is composed of a general assembly, a seat and a coordinating 
committee. The composition of each unit reflects a typical jury selection method; persons 
tapped from within the community considered as “honest Rwandans” of “good behaviour and 
good morals, always tell the truth, trust worthy, speak openly, free from sectarianism and 
discrimination…”83. The functioning of the various jurisdictions follows a conventional 
pattern of the organisation of judicial procedures whether in civil or criminal justice issues. 
The "Gacaca tribunals" have jurisdictions similar to those of ordinary criminal jurisdictions 
to try defendants using testimonies in favour or against them
84
. The lowest jurisdiction which 
is at the level of the cell establishes the list of residents in the cell before, during and after the 
genocide. Most importantly the list of victims and perpetrators and is endowed with the 
responsibility of examining category 1V cases as defined by the organic law. These are cases 
of individuals responsible for minor crimes especially in the destruction of property realm. Its 
preliminary hearing role makes it an important level of the escalation procedure. Those seen 
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as fitting within category III are forwarded to the sector ‘Gacaca tribunal’ and the II and I to 
the districts and provinces respectively. These levels hear the appeals of verdicts delivered by 
the cells, provides evidence for the defence or prosecution in the trials of genocide and crimes 
against humanity; receives confessions and guilty pleas’.85 The basis of this strictly 
community form of composition is deemed consistent with the purpose for which this form of 
justice dispenser is rationalised. Accordingly, it wouldn’t be wrong though not totally 
consistent with other restorative forms of justice systems to say the Gacaca tribunals are 
organised to act as restorative institutions with the aim "to establish the truth about what 
happened, with the communities which were the eye witnesses of the crime giving witness 
about the crimes." The genocide in Rwanda destroyed the institutions of states and robbed the 
country of its human resource in the management of societal relationship. This has been the 
focus of post genocide reconstruction whether in terms of peace building or reconciliation. 
The Gacaca system seems to add another level of post genocide justice and reconciliation. By 
its method of composition based on community and its form of operation rooted in customary 
traditions that taps into endogenous attributes, the Gacaca is sold as an institution that 
addresses the psychological trauma left by the genocide. The proximity of the killings and the 
massive participation of the society left a traumatic gap that can only be filled by a well-
crafted method of truth, confessions, forgiveness and reconciliation. By engaging perpetrators 
and victims within this close setup meant to expose the truth about the crime of genocide and 
concurrently punish category 1 participants, the Gacaca tribunals’ sets precedence in Africa’s 
post conflict peace building mechanism that could stand out as a model for the continent. 
Apart from seeking to establish the truth which forms a proper point of departure for 
reconciliation, the Gacaca tribunal also seeks to fight the culture of impunity through 
accountability and effecting proper re-integration without recrimination into society. Despite 
its merit speedy administration of justice has been lacking due to the sheer number of people 
being detained. By the end of 2001 about 6500 genocide suspects had been judged with 
acquittal rate of 1000 verdicts issued annually.
86
 The Gacaca system while portraying an 
indigenous system of justice dispenser does not as Tiemessen (2004) alludes preclude its 
potential for inciting ethnic tension if it purports to serve as an instrument of Tutsi 
power.
87
Timothy Longman(2010) argues that “if regaining social equilibrium is the central 
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idea of the Rwandan conception of utabera, then all of the judicial processes implemented in 
response to the 1994 Rwandan violence—including gacaca—have mostly failed. While 
genocide crimes are particularly serious and must be addressed, the complete absence of 
accountability for crimes committed by the RPF—which may have left as many as 200,000 
Rwandans dead in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo—undermines the 
potential impact of trials to promote reconciliation. The one-sided nature of all of the trials 
has contributed to the impression that the government is merely seeking to establish its 
dominance and exercise power rather than promoting justice
88
. 
The Tutsis also feel that the Hutus revisionist tendency amounts to genocide denial or better 
put attempting to equate organised pattern of state-centric violence aimed at annihilation to 
acts of what Kagame describes as actions of rogue elements of the military arm of the RPF.  
The Rwandan government has also attempted to solve this problem with solutions that insist 
on de-ethicising Rwanda and constructing a national identity above the ethnic allegiance that 
has defined its historical evolution from colonial rule. By attempting to outlaw ethnicity 
through formulating laws that criminalise speech perceived as inciting or discriminating
89
 and 
at the same time instituting a remembrance ideology that translates into collective guilt of the 
Hutus generates conflict and as Hutus argue undermines post conflict reconciliation boat. 
Having reviewed the working mechanism of the post genocide justice mechanism, its merit 
and objective, the next section would focus on the presentation an analysis of both the 
primary and secondary data with the view of understanding its impact on the objective of the 
Post genocide justice mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS: 
Dealing with qualitative data can be very trying because of the volume of data one has to 
handle. To facilitate understanding, this data will be dealt with in four phases. The first phase 
will be dedicated to setting the scene, research area and subjects. The remaining three phases 
will follow Wolcott’s (1994) triad perspective of dealing with qualitative data. This will 
involve the descriptive phase which ensures that the data speaks for itself; the analytic phase 
will be dedicated to expanding and extending data beyond the descriptive phase, identifying 
key factors and relationships. According to Wolcott, analysis is structured, formal, grounded, 
methodical and carefully documented. The interpretative phase will involve dealing with the 
data in a way that ‘transcends factual data and cautious analysis and begins to probe into what 
is to be made of them (Amanda & Atkinson 1996; 9). While analysis usually begins with data 
collection as to facilitate reorientation during the data collection process, a final and distinct 
phase of analysis is relevant. This section adopts a dual approach to data analysis. It begins 
with the conceptualization of the data and ends with its interpretation 
5.1. CONCEPTUALISING THE FINDINGS: 
Post Conflict Justice Mechanisms viewed from a holistic perspective fits the abstract rule 
where externality is self-evident to any content which scientific method is necessary to 
validate or invalidate. The relation between object and method is quite critical to approach 
such a holistic self-evident object of analysis. That is why an analytic approach that isolates 
the constituent part of the concept and to examine them separately is crucial. Although this 
may fragment a perceived unified phenomenon, it remains the only way to disentangle 
oneself from the self-evident nature of the externality of the object of analysis. 
 
5.1.1. THE GACACA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ‘VICTORS’ JUSTICE: 
The most compelling case against the Gacaca is its perceived role as an institution designed 
to prosecute the vanquished. This system of ‘victors’ justice is discredited by most 
respondents as biased, partial and based on retribution. This institution of justice dispenser is 
perceived to hinder reconciliation and foster acrimony between the Hutus and Tutsis 
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“It is an abomination on all lines established to destroy part of the society Respondent G 
argues…it’s a shame’. It is politicized and has thus made reconciliation a failure…we need to 
draw lessons from this in order to proceed’. 
Respondent D was even blunter.  
“It existed under the feudal system under Tutsi rule and judged Hutus/Tutsis and Twas but 
now it judges only Hutus. Hutu ethnic group is already condemned”. 
Respondent F negated the status of the ICTR as an institution designed to judge both victor 
and vanquished and tied the non-cooperation of Kigali to the premise of the ICTR as 
reminiscence of post genocide justice developed and sustained around the notion of victors’ 
justice.  
The Gacaca he laments 
 “…was meant to arrest arbitrarily the majority of the population. Arusha was a system of 
justice meant to judge former politicians. Arusha judges one side and not the other which has 
committed war crimes. Gacaca was organized to destroy those considered as members of old 
regime. The system of justice is centred around Kagame. He is head of justice”. 
In situating Gacaca as a system of victors’ justice and highlighting its transformation from an 
institution of restorative local justice to one of retribution without the required competence to 
discharge justice the respondents went beyond charging it as a Kangaroo court but one of 
great incompetence.  
5.1.2. GACACA AS AN INCOMPENTENT INSTITUTION 
One of the main critiques of Gacaca is its role as an institution of retributive justice void of 
the competence attributed to such an institution. Many respondents argue that the original 
scope of Gacaca as a local dispute resolution institution was extended to include criminal 
prosecution without the corresponding legal backup to support fairness and impartiality. 
Respondent C puts it in historical context and situates its transformation as problematic. He 
argues that: 
“…it was a system meant to settle clan disputes between wife and husband, neighbors, not 
heavy crimes like killing people. People who run the Gacaca system are not really qualified. I 
can compare the Gacaca to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission whose 
aim was supposed to be to reconcile people”. 
By attempting to situate the argument in historical context most respondents deliberately 
struggled to establish the transformative path as politically driven and designed around 
targeted punitive measures solely against Hutus. 
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Respondent A contextualized it as follows: 
“The Gacaca was a traditional system of justice in Rwanda which equated to conseille de 
famille. It was not a court but a family assembly design to treat family issues and could only 
impose penalties of 1000 CFA and below. Anything above goes to the court…It has been 
transformed into a court with untrained judges. A system in which victims are Tutsis and 
perpetrators are Hutus. Appearing infront of the Gacaca on your knees without a lawyer but 
the judges can send you to prison for 30 years. Once a Tutsi sees a Hutu they begin to cry and 
you can’t say no…most Hutus prefer to accept accusations inorder to earn lesser 
sentences…” 
Respondent D argues in the same line as most others had done.  Gacaca he argues 
“…was not the invention of the present government. The original objective of Gacaca was to 
regulate conflicts associated with theft and other family feuds. It had no mandate to judge 
crimes within the power of jurists, especially in imposing penalties’ of life imprisonment”. 
The critique of the Gacaca as an institution goes beyond its one sided nature in the 
performance of its role as defined by its founding law or its transformation from a customary 
institution to a criminal one without the pillars to support it but more importantly is its role in 
fostering what Hutus perceive as mob justice through landed and other property extorting 
schemes. Respondent B summed the three premises as follows:  
“Gacaca is a political instrument use to eliminate and imprison opponents. It has been 
redesigned from its original form and has been instrumentalised against the Hutus for the 
purpose of expropriation and pushing Hutus away from the villages…it promotes division 
because there are persons who have been condemned who are innocent”. 
It is a position echoed by Respondent G 
“it is an abomination on all lines established to destroy part of the society…it is a shame. It is 
politicized and has thus made reconciliation a failure…we need to draw lessons from this 
inorder to proceed”. 
Most respondents view Gacaca as legitimating the expropriation of Hutu property through a 
system of naming, forced confessions, condemnation and consequently extortion. Accusers 
Respondent D sums it up this way. Accusers 
 “accuse base on benefit they will get from accusation. Those who accuse do not accuse 
spontaneously but they have been prepared by experts who manipulate accusers to accuse 
Hutus; especially Hutus with properties” 
 
5.1.3. GACACA AS AN INSTITUTION OF EXPROPRIATION: 
The conception of justice in Rwanda designed to deal with post genocide cases received a 
mixed review from scholars and an almost unanimous condemnation from my respondents as 
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an institution of usurpation and expropriation of the other defined by the victors. Most of the 
respondents defined the institution of Gacaca as one defined around the naming, exclusion 
and appropriation of the property of the accused.  
Respondent C argues that  
“…it has been used by others to steal property. It happened to us…our house was taken over 
because of claims that soldiers under my father’s command stole properties. My father was 
never given a chance to defend himself. That’s how we see the Gacaca, as a system of 
property expropriation. You cannot judge every crime that happened in Rwanda because 
there were many crimes. There must be neutral investigators who should ask the Tutsis and 
Hutus what happened and based on that people can be accused, given a chance to defend 
themselves. For the moment only one ethnic group is being tried. This creates more 
problems. For how will they settle the expropriated properties?”  
“Accusers accuse base on benefit they will get from accusation. Those who accuse do not 
accuse spontaneously but they have been prepared by experts who manipulate accusers to 
accuse Hutus; especially Hutus with properties” (Respondent D) 
Most Hutus perceive Gacaca as an institution that legitimates the dispossession of Hutus of 
their properties through ‘false accusations’ and acts of vengeance and mob justice. It is Hutus 
argue a way of pushing them out of the country and causing the repopulation of scarce lands 
which is important for demographic dynamics in Rwanda. 
5.1.4. A SENSE OF SHARED LOSS: 
Nuremberg set the basis for modern day transitional form of justice. This victors approach to 
justice has not seen any paradigm shift since both the military and political leaders of the 
Nazi regime were arrested and arraigned before the Nuremberg tribunal by the victorious 
powers of WWII 
The recurrent theme during my investigation is an overwhelming feeling by all the 
respondents that Tutsis as well as Hutus suffered retribution in equal measure.  
Respondent B framed it this way: 
“What happened in Rwanda cannot be termed as genocide according to the genocide 
convention…if there was genocide in Rwanda, then there was double genocide…Tutsis being 
killed because they were Tutsis and Hutus were also killed because they were Hutus. The 
killing of Habyarimana by the RPF resulted in anarchy because the hierarchy was 
dictatorial… Each family lost at least a single person but remembrance has been only for 
Tutsis...”  
Respondent C argues as such: 
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”As the Interehamwe were killing people the RPF was killing people too.” 
The sense of shared loss is informed by the way the genocide occurred. 
Respondent B again puts it in context: 
“If you compare what happened in Germany you will notice there was no war between 
Germans and Jews…in Rwanda there was a war because Tutsis were bent on taking power 
since 1990…and during and after 1994 the RPF was bent on killing Hutu refugees”. 
The disgust with the post genocide justice mechanism is based on the perception of a system 
of victor’s justice designed to continue the Tutsi strategy of political domination at both a 
judicial and pseudo-judicial level. Most respondents argue that the crimes of the RPF have 
either been ignored or have simply been swept beneath the carpet by a complicit international 
community and the tyranny of the victor of the civil war. This perceived sense of negation of 
the suffering of Hutus most respondents argue fuels the sense of frustration which inevitably 
translate into violence. 
5.1.5. ENFORCED BYSTANDER EFFECT: 
The responsibility to protect or the dominant approach to circumventing sovereignty known 
as humanitarian intervention was never invoked to protect Rwandans. This is a feeling 
expressed both by Hutus as well as Tutsis. The effect of non-intervention is reflected in the 
way the current Rwandan government perceives the effort of the ICTR in using the 
retributive justice to ‘foster reconciliation’. The initial non-cooperation approach justified on 
certain grounds including most importantly the failure of the international community to 
intervene to save Rwandans strengthen and legitimated the victors approach to post genocide 
justice adopted by Kigali. During my field work some respondents argued that the lack of 
intervention was actually caused by Kagame and the RPF’s desire to conquer power. 
Respondent C posits that  
“he (Kagame) threatened everybody who talked about intervention in 1994…”  
He referred me to Colonel Marshall’s testimony. He once more stressed that:  
“to start a war you need preparations, logistics, ammunitions; there must be preparation. RPF 
was in Kigali in December 1993. They occupied the parliament; RPF used their base in 
Kigali as their platform for something else other than the peace process…” 
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It is that level of preparation, most argued that re-enforced the RPF’s believe that it could 
seize power and thus any intervention would only come to hamper that move. Respondent A 
explained this in context in an email to me on 10.11.11 and referred me to a video link right 
after I arrived back to Norway:  
voici le video(sur la site tu vas trouve beaucoup des videos du rwanda post-genocide) qui 
montre Kagame avec les casque bleues(from Canada-UN) et dans le video il explique qu'il ne 
veut pas que les etranges intervienes dans l'affaire interne du Rwanda parque il avait peur 
qu'on l'empeche de prendre le pouvoir! Donc si il dit ques la communaute etrangeres n'a rien 
fait pour aide le rwanda ou pour stoppe la guerre, c'est du pur cynisme et chantages de 
Kagame pour qu'on ne continue pas de le demande les crimes commises par ses hommes et 
lui-meme!
90
 
 (this is the video that shows Kagame with UN monitors from Canada. In the video he 
explains that he doesn’t want foreigners to intervene in the internal affairs of Rwanda because 
he was afraid that they would impede his drive to conquer power…) 
 
5.1.6. AGENCY EFFECT:  
Anthony Giddens (1976) duality of structure underscores the agent structure relationship as 
an immutable reciprocating feature in shaping agency and structural action. In the same vein 
Sewell argues that structure shapes peoples practices but it is also people’s practices that 
constitute structures. In this view of things, human agency and structure, far from being 
oppose, in fact presuppose each other.
91
 Presupposing that these articulations are statements 
of facts, it wouldn’t be wrong to conclude why most Hutus perceive Kagame as the principal 
agent of the post genocide structural changes that Rwanda has experience and how in turn 
those structural changes have strengthen Kagame and the Tutsi position is determining the 
future political dynamics of the country. Under Habyarimana it was clear that the structure 
that held sway on political decisions was the Akazu. Under kagame, Hutus have no doubt that 
the greatest political force of the country is invested in Paul Kagame. And as the RNC 
document on ‘Pathway to peaceful change’ asserts, ‘president Paul Kagame has converted 
both the RPF and the RPA …instruments for sustaining his personal and absolute control of 
the state. Rwandans have been a tool under successive Rwandan  leaders’. Respondent C 
describes Kagame as 
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“…authoritarian… a dangerous person. He has managed now to soften his image but he has 
not changed. He can’t kill people again and hide it because of social media. So he has devised 
other methods to eliminate people. His name represents everything bad. With him gone, I 
can’t be sure. But I don’t really think he can go peacefully”. 
While some of the respondents feel that Kagame represents the biggest obstacle to 
reconciliation and an agent of retributive justice others underscore the structure agent relation  
Respondent J explains it as follows: 
“Kagame has his power he needs to protect. He eliminates every opponent from the villages 
right up to the government. Kagame is the singular figure behind the crimes in the country 
but there is a system built out of deceit. The façade behind this system is Kagame. Putting the 
two together makes a very dangerous situation…” 
 
5.2 DATA INTERPRETATION: 
Post Conflict Justice is such a pervasive notion that any attempt to reach a normative 
judgement especially in legislating its institutionalisation must take cognizant of the 
emerging tensions between its constituent groups. The literature on post genocide justice 
marries with Shontholz formulation on dispute and conflict. One school of thought argues 
that the nature of the Post genocide justice is politicised and fits squarely into the Nurnberg 
paradigm. From my interviews with Hutus, almost 95% argue that the system under Gacaca 
and the national justice system is designed around a political rational aimed at punishing 
Hutus…On the other hand, the ICTR that revolves around international norms in the 
administration of justice epitomises what Shontholz describes as the democratic tradition of 
dispute resolution. But on the whole the transitional justice mechanism in Rwanda has 
followed a retributive pattern rationalised on the backward looking ground of ending 
impunity and the forward looking ground of reconciliation. Teitel (2000) argues that the 
problem with a backward looking approach in achieving a prospective premise is the non-
foundational legal underpinning of the entire process. This he argues has the potential of 
‘risking the wrong message of political justice…’(Teitel 2000;30).  Factoring in the reality of 
the ICTR which has so far failed to indict or arraigned any member of the RPF or RPA and 
the accusations by Hutus that the Gacaca and national tribunal are institutions of victors’ 
justice, it is easy to see why Teitel’s fear is real. This is the effort invested by Shontholz in 
structuring the nature of transitional justice and its intended outcome.  
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5.2.1. RETRIBUTION VERSUS RESTORATION: 
The literature is rich with arguments about the conditions that determine the choice of a 
particular post conflict regime. In this section, I examine those conditions with respect to 
Rwanda. 
5.2.1.1. MODE OF CONFLICT TERMINATION AND NATURE OF POST 
CONFLICT REGIME: 
 
The study would deal with these arguments together because they seem in every regard to be 
mutually re-enforcing attributes. The literature is quite adamant that an outright victory by an 
incoming regime ensures a post conflict justice mechanism tailored towards retribution.’ 
Tove et al argues that an outright defeat of the old regime inevitably takes away any 
impediment for the new regime in establishing a retributive regime of post conflict justice 
system. Elster (2004) writes extensively on historical cases of dealing with past wrongs. 
Though he focuses on transition from autocracy to democracy his book is relevant in 
capturing some essential prerequisites on the choice of post conflict justice system which is 
the nature of the termination of the conflict. A key literature in this field is the dataset of 
Binningsbø, Elster & Gates (2005).  The key tenet of this dataset confirms the bottom line 
assertion that making ‘transitional justice more likely, if the conflict is terminated by victory 
by the government or the opposition than if it is terminated by agreements, negotiations or 
cease-fire.  The RPA defeated the FAR and installed a new regime based on its values and 
political agenda. The new regime argued that a retributive form of justice is designed to end 
the culture of impunity that had characterised Rwanda’s history. Hutus and other critics of the 
regime do not argue that this culture has existed. What most of my respondents stressed is the 
fact that this culture has not been masterminded solely by the two Hutu led regimes. 
Consequently most Hutus argue that the form of termination of the conflict should not 
entirely on its own determine the form of post conflict justice. Respondent B added that the 
situation of genocide in Rwanda differed markedly with that of the Jews because in the latter 
there was no war between the perpetrating group and the victim group while in the former 
there was a conflict within which both sides violated the customs of war. Contrary to this 
holistic critic, the ICTR is designed to resolve this tension barring the non-cooperation with 
Kigali. Consequently one may argue that there is a direct correlation between mode of 
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termination of a conflict and the nature of the post conflict justice process. For if termination 
by collapse inevitably leads to a retributive form of justice, under an autocratic regime one 
would expect Shontholz postulation of political trials to hold true. This argument would be 
developed for Rwanda later. The nature of the post conflict regime is frequently determined 
on the nature of the termination of the particular conflict. Most conflicts that end through 
negotiations see the emergence of a new regime based on a peace accord and a power sharing 
system. As argued before, in Rwanda the FAR was defeated leading to the installation of an 
RPF regime. 
5.2.1.2 DURATION OF PREVIOUS REGIME: 
The same literature advances duration of previous regime as a determinant to the choice of 
any post conflict justice system. Elster 2004 argues that the longer a regime stays in power 
the weaker the memory of its crimes and the more likely the possibility of the choice of a 
restorative form of post conflict justice system.  Factoring in Rwanda it wouldn’t be wrong to 
suggest that 30 years of Hutu domination and ‘impunity’ under Kayabanda and Habyarimana 
was a long time; on the contrary the apex of impunity of the Hutu reign lasted less than 100 
days. This thus brought a thirty year reign to an unforgettable finale that left no one in doubt 
on the course the victorious powers and the international community would take to ensure 
accountability. While I didn’t set out to investigate the reasons that influence the choice of 
any particular form of post conflict justice regime, there is an important correlation between 
the literature and the choice the RPF made in establishing its regime of accountability. 
Consequently it wouldn’t be wrong to argue that the short period of 100 days within which an 
unforgettable carnage resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands made the call for 
retributive justice a virtual certainty.  
5.3. IMPLICATION ON RECONCILIATION 
In the section above, the study has focused on the influence the various concepts under 
investigation had on the choice of Rwanda’s post genocide justice system. Although this 
remain implied implications, there is no argument with the fact as repeatedly stated during 
this study that retribution as against restoration was a conscious decision of the victorious 
powers that now govern Rwanda. Rationalised on the basis of ending a long culture of 
impunity, this decision was not inconsistent with international mechanism of post conflict 
justice which usually focuses on retribution. Teitel (2000) has dealt with its limitations. He 
argues that although trials in this context are intended to serve political purposes…to disavow 
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predecessor political norms, and to construct a new legal order, these are in tension with 
conventional understandings of the rule of law (Teitel 2000:30). Rwanda’s post genocide 
justice has received a fair amount of scrutiny. It is thus proper to examine the implications 
this system has on political order and the process of reconciliation which the systems set out 
to achieve. To do this will entail explaining my empirics’ i.e. both primary and secondary 
data. Restating my framework of analysis advanced by Shonholtz (2003), disputes occur in 
transitional and mature democracies while conflicts are assigned to authoritarian regimes. 
The first premise of this theory is that in democratic societies, there are no conflicts, rather 
only disputes. The second premise of this theory is that in authoritarian regimes there are only 
conflicts and politicised systems of settlements. The Third Premise is that in international 
relations, national states can transform conflicts into disputes. Conflicts are those issues that 
lack a legitimate, reliable, transparent, non-arbitrary forum for the peaceful settlement of 
differences. Disputes, conversely, are pre-described as having recognized forums for their 
expression and resolution that meet the above criteria. In short, conflicts lack a viable 
“container” for the routine management of differences. What is important here is the form of 
‘dispute or conflict resolutions’. According to Shonholtz democracies have a recognised 
forum for resolving disputes which is legitimate, reliable and non- arbitrary. On the other 
hand, authoritarian states faced with conflicts employ ‘politicised systems of settlements. 
Consequently it will be proper for me to determine what form of state I am dealing with in 
order to factor out what system of justice application is employed. It might not be 
straightforward as Shonholtz third premise alludes to the fact that states can actually 
transform conflict situations into disputes with the outcome of fairness. Since the study was 
never intended to examine whether Rwanda is actually a democracy or an authoritarian state 
the study would use other sources to make this determination. Secondly, the study would also 
engage in some level of presumption on both premises, factoring in my data in both.  
5.3.1 RWANDA’S DEMOCRATIC INDEX: 
Before dealing with the empirics, it will be necessary to determine where Rwanda stands in 
the democracy – autocracy index. The Economist Intelligence Unit in its 2010 democracy 
index ranks Rwanda 134 down from 121 in 2008. In its 2011 report, it classifies four types of 
regimes; full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. 
Rwanda is ranked 136 down from 134 the previous year and classified as an authoritarian 
regime. Following the transition from the Civil War in 1992, the government in Rwanda has 
grown more repressive (Freedom House 2007). While there are regular elections, both choice 
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and information is limited, leading Freedom House to declare that Rwanda is both “not an 
electoral democracy” and “not free”. Since the military victory in 1994, the RPF is said to 
maintain careful control over political life. It is in this political context that the conflict frame 
has emerged. It is a situation expressed by most Rwandans who took part in a demonstration 
in front of the Rwandan embassy in Brussels in November 2011. During this demonstration, 
respondent C whose wife, Victoire Ingabire is currently facing charges of terrorism and 
revisionism and genocide ideology was even more emphatic about the nature of rule under 
the present Rwandan eadership. He said ‘as long as there is a dictator who imposes, there can 
be no justice’. 
Most respondents to the study made the same unequivocal assertion about the nature of the 
regime in Kigali. The study would therefore work on this correlated presumption that 
Rwanda is actually an authoritarian regime. There is no doubt that had this study included 
Tutsis and Rwandan government officials, we would be dealing with an entirely different sets 
of suppositions. Since this was never included in the scope of the study, a possible 
comparative account in the future might be able to deal with specific empirical realities to 
validate or invalidate the claim of both sides and reach a more acceptable conclusion on the 
nature of the regime. 
5.4. DATA DISCUSSION:   
Having firmly established that Rwanda is an autocracy it is thus easy to explain the different 
facets of my findings. Teitel makes a very sweeping statement on the nature of law in 
situations of transition. He argues that the period of normative shift is commonly thought to 
be anti-paradigmatic. Such a normative shift in Rwanda was not only characterised by a 
change in regime type and ideology but a dramatic shift from foundational to transitional 
form of justice.  If this anti-paradigmatic situation created by the very nature of a normative 
shift is true irrespective of the nature of post conflict regime what then makes trials under 
autocratic regimes not to fit into Shontholz first and second postulations? If one properly 
examines the Nuremberg trials it would be easy to conclude on a departure from foundational 
form of justice dispensation as it was clear that continuity and directionality were replaced by 
retroactivity and contingency. Due process and substantive law were directed strictly towards 
the attainment of a certain outcome underpinned by political imperatives. It was designed 
towards punishing German impunity and to undo the restorative scheme of Versailles and 
establish a foundational system of rules governing the dealing with regimes like those of 
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Hitler and Mussolini. Teitel makes this easier through a narrower scope when he argues that 
which rule of law values ultimately takes precedence in transition is a function of the 
particular historical and political legacies that is of the primary understanding of the sources 
of fear, insecurity…consequently presuming this particularism holds true for all situations, it 
wouldn’t be untrue to  associate the source of fear and insecurity to the historical reality 
Tutsis have faced under the first and second republics and the way these vices shaped the 
structure of the current regime and dictated its accountability regime. This would be a 
generalizable postulation if it holds true for all autocratic systems. Factoring in Rwanda as an 
autocratic system and bringing in the responses of my respondents, it would be easy to make 
such a conclusion without sufficient evidence to the contrary. 
Now by picking up the pieces of the empirics and see whether they validate or invalidate my 
theoretical framework. 
On the legitimacy of a mechanism of justice dispensation one would expect the source of 
authority of that institution to be legitimate and constituted through due process derived 
through delegated authority. One of the determinants of an autocratic regime is the absence of 
consent and thus the absence of legitimacy. Before dealing with the Gacaca and the national 
jurisdiction of justice dispensation it is most essential to determine the authority from which 
the authorities of Gacaca is derived. As earlier discussed, that system is autocratic. That 
might not determine the nature of the Gacaca or any other domestic jurisdiction of justice 
dispensation. But reviewing the statements of my respondents it would be indisputable to 
conclude that despite the legal positivist foundation upon which the Gacaca is founded, it 
may as most assert lack the independence to operate and discharge justice based on 
established rules void of political influence. Respondent G reflects on the Gacaca as follows: 
It is an abomination on all lines established to destroy part of the society.  lt’s a shame’. It is 
politicized and has thus made reconciliation a failure…we need to draw lessons from this in 
order to proceed’. 
Reliability is consistent with foundational systems of justice. As Teitel argues transitional 
justice is contingent on many factors and consequently reliability is sacrificed. When rules 
are contingent on historical realities and evolving reality of dealing with a bottom up 
genocide, they are bound to be arbitrary even if initially grounded on a rule of law basis. The 
Gacaca functions on some skewed concepts of confessions and forgiveness and naming. As 
most respondents argue this system of naming has transformed the Gacaca into a system 
designed to expropriate Hutu lands.  
 78  
Respondent C argues thus: 
“The Gacaca has been used by others to steal property. It happened to us. Our house was 
taken over because of claims that soldiers under my father’s command stole properties. My 
father was never given the chance to defend himself. That is how we see the Gacaca…” 
Under such a system power is arbitrary. It is also clear that the nature of the genocide 
convention that hinges on ‘intent to destroy in whole or in part’ inevitably made the killing of 
Tutsis a genocidal crime while the killing of Hutus as crimes against humanity or other war 
crimes. Consequently as many of the respondents argued the post genocide justice 
architecture was thus designed around this premise set by the definition. The weight 
attributed to intent rather than numbers and to planning and conspiracy translated into a 
justice mechanism most of my respondents perceived as ‘victors justice’. On the contrary 
genocide is not the only crime under trial by both the international jurisdiction overseen by 
the ICTR and the domestic jurisdiction overseen by Gacaca and the national courts. Both 
jurisdictions are also hearing evidence on crimes against humanity and war crimes. Why are 
then both jurisdictions of justice perceived by Hutus as unfair? Two issues come into play 
here. The first one is the weight attributed to the crime of genocide. Genocide is perceived as 
the mother of all crimes and its perpetrators seen according to the admiralty laws as the 
‘enemies of all mankind’ with universal jurisdiction of prosecution. Consequently being 
attributed with intent to wipe out an indelible group carries a lot of moral significance and 
leaves an indelible tag on the accused group. This is not what my respondents take lightly. 
The nature of the Holocaust that prompted the drafting of the convention is yet to be 
surpassed in its bestiality against a people for simply ‘belonging’. The Holocaust also set the 
bar so high that modern day genocides negate the role ‘war’ against the victim population 
plays as a defining role in creating the opportunity for the ‘prohibitions’ of war to occur. As 
respondent B suggest and rightly too ‘there was no war between the Germans and the Jews 
but in Rwanda there was a war…”.  Even though the study may question the implication of 
his assertion that consequently “what happened in Rwanda cannot be termed as genocide 
according to the genocide convention” there is no disagreement that the definition of 
genocide as conceived by Lemkin in describing what the Germans did in a “not a war” 
context on the group targeted as part of the “final solution” can be very problematic in a war 
context especially when the perpetrator group also feels a great sense of loss. Consequently 
by attributing the mother of all crimes just to one side in a conflict situation even when 
evidence shows that there might have been more Hutus killed than Tutsis questions according 
to most respondents the ‘impartiality’ of the justice mechanism. The second issue which is 
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directly related to the weight of the crime is the role the international community played 
during the period of the genocide. The role of the international community is quite important 
in determining which form of post conflict justice system is instituted after a particular 
conflict. Post Nuremberg saw the emergence of domestic post conflict regimes rationalised 
on the notion of local ownership of justice contextualised to historical and local realities.  
Respondent A accuses Kagame for having been the stumbling block to any humanitarian 
intervention. On the other hand Kagame accuses France for not only having been a stumbling 
block to any humanitarian intervention but for supporting and abetting the genocide through 
direct support and protection of the genocidaires and effecting operation Turquoise to create 
safe corridors for alleged perpetrators and planners of the genocide. The absence of 
intervention had far reaching implications in the choice and quality of justice. On the former 
the non-cooperation of Kigali with Arusha means crimes of the RPF which should mainly be 
in the realm of war crimes and crimes against humanity are not heard by the tribunal. This 
adds relevance to the accusation by most respondents that the system of post genocide justice 
is designed around victors justice premise. On the latter non- intervention means the absence 
of the principles of human security which underpinned the design of R2P and its cousin of 
PoC drummed repeatedly by Kofi Annan left a void which was filled by the perpetrators. The 
consequence of this was the killing of countries intelligentsia, lawyers, judges and other 
trained professionals important for foundational form of justice grounded in the rule of law 
that reflect domestic and international norms of fairness and impartiality.  
The study began with an unwritten presumed statement of fact which it was sure would be 
validated. That there was genocide against the Tutsis and that the perpetrators were Hutus 
who needed to be brought to justice was never in doubt. This thesis did not stand the test of 
empirical scrutiny at the end of this study. The study narrative of the Rwandan tragedy has 
been mainly RPF-international Community centric. Three narratives have shaped the 
discourse about Rwanda. The first narrative is that there was genocide of Tutsis committed 
by Hutus. The shift from Rwandan genocide to genocide of Tutsis was a deliberate attempt to 
frame the post genocide political era towards the attainment of certain political imperatives. 
The second narrative is that the international community failed Rwanda at its greatest 
moment of need. This has been dealt with above. The third narrative has been that the RPF 
liberated the Tutsis from near annihilation. The last narrative which this study uncovers is 
that despite the defeat of FAR by the RPF, the majority of FAR members accompanied by 
millions of refugees relocated to the DRC and have continuously posed a threat to Rwandas’ 
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security. And because this threat is framed around historical narrative of ethnicity, the 
respond to such a threat almost takes an ethnic inclination. Consequently the ethnic tension, 
genuine or strategically framed continuously shapes both the political and justice rationales. 
The RPF liberation narrative also seeks to construct a discourse that credits the RPF 
leadership for ending the genocide and through this process the RPF derives an automatic 
legitimation to govern. By using ethnicity, the liberation narrative and an external threat the 
present RPF leadership has projected itself as the most competent to stop the country from 
sliding back into an era characterised by violence, economic stagnation and insecurity. 
Consequently the suppression of domestic opposition and the design of the post genocide 
justice system are justified based on these narratives. The 1994 genocide has become an 
ideological weapon allowing the RPF to acquire and maintain victim status and, as a 
perceived form of compensation, to enjoy complete immunity (Reyntjens 2004; 199). 
Reyntjens goes on to argue that what Rwanda is experiencing is not democracy and 
reconciliation but dictatorship and exclusion. This seems to coincide with the major findings 
of this study and it is a finding with far reaching implications on reconciliation efforts and 
long term political order in the country. 
  
CONCLUSION: 
Most intrastate conflicts in Africa are characterised by widespread impunity and the violation 
of the fundamental human rights of individuals. Rwanda presented itself as everything that 
was and is still wrong with the permissions and prohibitions of war. After most conflicts the 
governments and international Community begin the process of nation or state building or 
both. Accountability for past wrongs have also dominated most post conflict societies with 
the aim of addressing the legacy of impunity and to address the human rights violations that 
people have suffered. Most post conflict justice institutions are designed as neutral 
institutions which should act with impartiality and render justice base on international norms 
of fairness and impartiality and local understanding of justice. But these institutions 
Teitel(2000) argues, are a function of the particular historical and political legacies that is of 
the primary understanding of the source of fear and insecurity and as the study has shown, the 
role the international community played in terminating the conflict is also a critical factor in 
shaping post conflict justice institutions. Consequently these institutions have departed from 
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their altruistic role and have been transformed into particular ideological institutions designed 
at delivering what Shonholtz alludes to as political justice.  
At the onset of this study, I set out to answer a particular research question; what are the 
implications of post genocide justice on reconciliation efforts in Rwanda? Galtung (2001) 
defines reconciliation as “the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators 
after violence, providing a closure of the bad relations” (Staub 2006;7).92 Healing strengthens 
the self, moderates the perception of the world as dangerous, and makes it more likely that 
positive changes in the other group are perceived.(Ibid;7) 
In answering this question, the study used a dual approach of 1) extensive analysis of four 
thematic areas associated with the Rwandan conflict and post conflict justice institutions II) a 
qualitative approach of unstructured interview with exile Hutu Rwandans, focus group 
discussions and participation in exclusive Hutu conclaves and exile political meetings. The 
study demonstrated that despite the influence of the time tested role of the mode of 
termination of conflict, post conflict regime type and longevity of past conflict, the particular 
historical legacy of the Rwandan conflict rooted in ethnic instrumentalisation shaped the post 
genocide justice system through victor(s) vanquished constructed narratives. The ethnicity 
/post conflict justice relationship is not a unidirectional one. Ethnicity has been used to 
influence the post genocide justice mechanism and the post genocide justice mechanism 
influences ethnic relations and threatens reconciliation. Tiemessen went as far as tagging the 
post genocide regime a “Tutsi ethnocracy” which she warned that “one of the dangers that the 
Tutsi ethnocracy poses to the success of Gacaca is that it serves the government’s agenda of 
assigning collective guilt to Hutus.” This notion of collective guilt is what most respondents 
expressed all through the field study and it is a notion also supported by the literature.  
These ethnicity narratives framed around historical mythologies have exacerbated mutual 
fears that have been instrumentalised for political expediencies by both the current RPF led 
government and the Hutu exile groups. By situating these narratives around the genocide, the 
RPF led government excluded from the justice frame the suffering of Hutus and created a 
victors moral rational legitimated by an RPF liberation narrative. It then created the Gacaca 
as a narrow base post genocide justice institution to legitimate this narrative. According to 
Hutus this institution is an incompetent RPF centric institution designed to legitimate 
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 Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the 
Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps toward a General Theory: Political 
Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2006 
 82  
expropriation, dispense partial justice that negate their own suffering. While the study 
uncovers the discrepancies between the current Gacaca and the former Gacaca that inspired 
the current form and the presence of this misunderstanding especially in most of my 
respondents, it is undeniable that the criminal scope of the present system does not in any 
way tie up with its competence, the demand of due process and presumption of innocence in 
its adjudicatory role. The struggle between legalism and pragmatism in the post genocide 
justice architecture is at the heart of the tension between the different narratives of the 
conflict. It is clear as seen by the study that the government chose the latter and consequently 
created a sense injustice which the many respondents feels does not help reconciliation 
efforts  
The study also demonstrated that the RPF led government has benefitted from the failure of 
the international community to have intervened to stop the genocide to garner international 
sympathy and to exclude itself from the justice mechanism setup in Arusha and in Rwanda. 
By failing to cooperate with the proceedings in Arusha, it successfully focuses the argument 
of the conflict period on the genocide which according to the narrow definition of 1948 
strengthens the suspicion of Hutus that the government is pursuing a victors justice approach 
designed to achieve a long term political goal of domination under the long term claim of 
Tutsis as people ‘born to rule’. By also refusing to cooperate with the proceedings in Arusha, 
the RPF led government has consolidated the rebranding of the genocide from Genocide in 
Rwanda to Genocide against Tutsis which it has used to suppress domestic opposition with 
accusations of revisionism and negation of a supposed uncontested objective reality. 
The study also showed that the state-centric ontology also framed the abuses. By focusing on 
the crimes of the state orchestrated by the past regime and not that of the RPF, the current 
government subscribes to the narrative of state centrism in the orchestration of a crime as 
massive as genocide. In this it relegates its own crimes within the framework of its ‘liberation 
narrative’. This, the study shows has made the RPF led government to conflate the state to the 
nation and consequently created a feeling of ethnic tension which further undermines 
reconciliation. Schabas argues that consequent on this conflation is the fact that the majority 
of the population appears to fall into the perpetrator camp, where there is less enthusiasm for 
uncompromising justice (Clarke & Kaufman 2008;227).  
The study also demonstrates that while the Gacaca provides the space for public discourse 
and engagement between the perpetrating and victim groups, this space is defined by law as 
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one of ‘confessions and forgiveness’ consequently narrowing the scope of engagement 
towards achieving a narrow objective defined by the conflict narrative of the RPF led 
government. The rigid nature of this engagement space stifles free communication, constructs 
‘truth’ and criminalises alternative narratives which is taken over by the political opposition 
to construct its own narrative. 
The alternating power dynamics in Rwanda that has been marked by pogroms, massacres and 
genocide has created a phobia between the Hutus and Tutsis. This phobia seems to have taken 
the form of a ‘speech act’ in which actors of the two main ethnic formations used an the 
argument of the existence of existential threat to define policies. Wæver argues that “… by 
labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.”(Wæver 2004a; 13) While the 
various leaders consequently assuming the role of securitising actors the referent objects have 
become the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups with each policy designed by the securitising actors 
purportedly with the aim of safeguarding the interest and even survival of the referent 
objects. The consequence has been a departure from foundational to ad hoc rules that are 
more backward looking rationalised to achieving a forward looking objective. 
In a nutshell the study was able to show that the different thematic considered influenced in 
some way the structure of the post genocide justice architecture and consequently caused it to 
be structured to discharge political justice which was detrimental to any post genocide 
reconciliation enterprise.  
Post conflict societies must realise that war in itself as a means of ending tyranny or 
oppression is consequentialist. The only side that wins in post conflict societies is that of 
justice. Consequently the realisation that even the vanquished do suffer some form of the 
prohibitions of war whether by omission or commission is critical in any reconciliation 
enterprise. Despite the framing of the genocide convention to exclude crimes of the victors of 
WW II, the subsequent recognition that without such an inclusion even in a symbolic manner 
justice might not be delivered in its fullest extent. The subsequent recognition of the 
destruction of Dresden in a small way wrestle control of that remembrance from the extreme 
right wing neo-Nazis. In the same vein, a recognition that most Rwandans whether Hutu or 
Tutsi have since the colonial period been victims of constructed mythologies which translated 
into deprivation, exclusion, pogroms, war crimes and genocide is important to put a halt to 
the cyclical alteration of power characterised by impunity and then political justice. Such 
recognition is the foundation upon which proper and genuine reconciliation can be built.  
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We live in a real world in which the ‘general good’ is framed along a statist ontology which 
the world prefers to frame around different notions of security from a bottom up perspective. 
It is this statist ontology that still frames the discourse of humanitarian intervention. Though 
the overriding concept of sovereignty that cloaks territorial control is no longer considered a 
static concept, the legal framing of its pre-eminence as defined by the UN Charter still 
revolves around the protection of political independence and territorial integrity. While a 
disputed framing when viewed from the notions of interdependence and multilateral 
undertakings by states that challenges their sovereignty, it is still albeit relatively a defining 
concept of interstate relations. Framed as a universal concept that also defined how Rwanda 
was treated conjures as De Carvalho et al alludes still ‘…glosses over the Eurocentric and 
racist foundations of the discipline by providing a Whiggish reading of the discipline’s birth 
on the one hand, while, on the other, providing an empiricist epistemology that is ill-equipped 
to handle the many-faceted and constantly changing challenges that confront the discipline 
today…’It is based on this multifaceted framing that shaped my understanding of post 
genocide Rwanda. Ethnicity alone whether primordial or constructed and then 
instrumentalised couldn’t alone have accounted for the events in Rwanda. The failure to 
intervene in Rwanda even if it failed as Kuppermann claims to have stopped or mitigated the 
effect of the genocide could have built a consensus that would have given post genocide 
justice the legitimacy it badly needs for accountability and reconciliation. On the other hand 
it may be devil’s advocacy to suppose without contest that the Hutu attitude towards post 
genocide justice is rooted in a mundane codification regime that thrives on the victims 
premise. Do all of these themes contribute in some way towards understanding the complex 
situation of an almost innovative African justice mechanism that departs from its traditional 
‘let’s forgive and forget and remain mired in our misery’? It is a question worth pursuing 
further but only through this multifaceted understanding could one have understood Rwanda 
and arrive at a normative judgement. These are issues that should be pursued further not as 
individual themes but as a package that should hopefully produce better empirics that can 
provide the basis for far reaching conclusions. 
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APPENDIX 
Communiqué des Familles des Victimes de l’Attentat du 6 Avril 1994 
 
A l’heure où nous nous souvenons de toutes les victimes de la tragédie rwandaise, 
nous souhaitons réaffirmer notre désir de vérité. 
C’était il y a dix huit ans déjà que l’avion qui emportait les nôtres a été lâchement 
abattu. Le temps qui passe n’efface pas le vide laissé par un père, un fils ou un époux. 
Mais au-delà d’un drame familial, c’est une vérité historique qui appartient à tout le 
peuple rwandais et qu’il s’agit d’établir. La mise en lumière des responsabilités dans 
l’attentat est nécessaire pour la rétablissement de la confiance et la réconciliation du 
peuple rwandais. 
Nous voulons dire notre confiance en la justice française. Nous connaissons son 
indépendance et sa rigueur. Un long chemin a déjà été parcouru mais des embuches 
demeurent. 
Aussi, nous saluons l’engagement de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de la 
Communauté internationale pour faire la lumière sur les assassinats des anciens 
premiers ministres du Liban et du Pakistan. Ces démarches sont louables pour les 
familles des victimes et pour l’histoire de leurs pays respectifs. 
Par le même souci de rendre justice à nos familles, mais aussi au peuple rwandais 
tout entier au vu du génocide qui a été déclenché par cet acte, nous faisons appel à ces 
mêmes instances afin qu’elles soutiennent toute démarche visant à établir la vérité. 
Nous ne baisserons pas les bras tant que cette vérité ne sera pas connue. 
Nous le devons à tous ceux qui ont péri dans cette tragédie ainsi qu’à la postérité. 
Nous avons le droit de savoir, le peuple rwandais a droit à la vérité. 
Les familles des victimes 
Liste des victimes de l’attentat terroriste du 6 avril 1994 
1. Général Major Juvénal HABYARIMANA, Président de la République Rwandaise 
2. Monsieur Cyprien NTARYAMIRA, Président de la République Burundaise 
3. Monsieur Bernard CIZA, Ministre d’Etat à la Planification, au Développement et à la 
Reconstruction du Burundi 
4. Monsieur Cyriaque SIMBIZI, Ministre de la Communication et porte-parole du 
gouvernement du Burundi 
5. Général Major Déogratias NSABIMANA, Chef d'état-major de l' Armée Rwandaise 
6. Ambassadeur Juvénal RENZAHO, Conseiller diplomatique du Président rwandais 
7. Colonel Elie SAGATWA, Secrétaire particulier et Chef de la sécurité du Président 
rwandais 
8. Docteur Emmanuel AKINGENEYE, Médecin particulier du Président rwandais 
9. Major Thaddée BAGARAGAZA, Officier d’ordonnance du Président rwandais et 
Commandant en 2nd du Bataillon Garde présidentielle 
10. Major Jacky HERAUD, Commandant de bord du Falcon présidentiel 
11. Commandant Jean-Pierre MINABERRY, Copilote du Falcon présidentiel 
12. Adjudant-chef Jean-Michel PERRINE, Mécanicien navigant du Falcon présidentiel 
 
 
